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REFORMING AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT LAW:
A MODEL STATUTE.

More than sixty percent of the American workforce has no reliable
protection against unjust dismissal. 1 Subject to the common law rule
of at-will employment, these individuals may be dismissed by their
employers without reason or prior notice. 2 Despite the grave injustice
that this rule has wrought on numerous employees, 3 efforts at reform
have been few and ineffective. Most efforts have involved judicially
created exceptions to the at-will rule based on contract law, Jjublic policy
considerations, and tort law. These judicial remedies, however, have
not succeeded in protecting employee job security interests. Formalistic
concepts of consideration and reliance often constrain courts from applying contract theories. Courts formulating public policy and tort exceptions have been reluctant to provide relief except in the rare situation where an employer expressly violates a legislatively mandated public
policy or breaches a duty owed to the employee.
I. This figure is derived by subtracting the number of employees protected against unjust
dismissal from the total workforce. Union members working under collective bargaining contracts and certain public sector employees are the major groups protected against dismissal. Union
members constitute less that 22% of the total workforce. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL.
No. 2000, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1978, at 507 (1979). The number of public sector
employees receiving protection under statutorily authorized collective bargaining, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-7135 (Supp. II 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 17.455(1)-(16) (Callaghan 1982), civil service
Jaws, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7514 (Supp. II 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.807 (Supp.
1982), or constitutional due process, see, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), is more difficult to measure. One commentator has
estimated that over 90% of the 2,879,000 federal civil service employees and over half of the
12,169,000 state and local government employees are covered by some kind of just cause protection. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Omo
ST. L.J. I, 8-9 (1979) (citing 1976 figures). These people make up approximately 11% of the
nonagricultural workforce. Additionally, a small percentage of employees have fixed-term contracts affording some measure of job protection. Id. By adding these groups together it is clear
that approximately 34%-39% of the workforce is covered, id., and 61 OJo-66% is without coverage.
2. See Payne v. Western & A. R. R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REV.
1404, 1405-06 (1967).
3. The unfairness that frequently results from this rule is illustrated by two recent cases.
In Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. -1981), an employee - testifying
in an administrative hearing at his employer's behest - was fired for revealing evidence under
oath that proved damaging to his employer. Similarly, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,
456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), an employee was fired after voicing concern over the safety
of a product manufactured by the company for which he worked.
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It is clear that a pressing need exists for well-defined, uniform, and
predictable protection for at-will employees. Workers must have comprehensive job-security safeguards, and employers must have reliable
guidelines indicating when dismissal is proper. Whatever the means
used to achieve reform, it must ensure speedy, informal, and inexpensive resolution of disputes. Court adjudication of these disputes cannot satisfy these goals. Too many courts are either unwilling or unable
to provide necessary protections, and even if they were to grant relief
on a more consistent basis, the attendant costs, formality, and delay
would prevent many employees from vindicating their rights.
Effective relief for at-will employees can only be achieved through
statutory reform. Although specific legislation has been proposed on
the federal 4 and state levels, 5 none of these bills have been sufficiently
comprehensive to provide optimal relief. Moreover, those commentators
who have called for a statutory remedy have failed to explain precisely
what the mechanism for dispute resolution should be, or how it should
operate. 6 This Note, therefore, proposes a model statute utilizing
mediation-arbitration to provide consistent, informal, and economical
protection for at-will employees. Part I explores the development of
the at-will rule and the deficiencies of current judicial reforms. Part
II sets forth the proposed Act. Accompanying each section is commentary designed to elucidate the intent and meaning of specific
provisions.
I.

DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE AT-WILL RULE

A.

The Rationale Behind the Rule

The traditional rule of at-will employment allows employers to
"dismiss their employes at will ... for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong." 7 The rule arose from a late nineteenth century transformation in employment law. Prior to that time, the rights of employer
4. See Corporate Democracy Act, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (proposed amendment to the National Labor Relations Act) [hereinafter cited as the federal bill]. For a discussion
of this bill, see infra text accompanying notes 79-81; see also THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL IssuE,
111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 9 (Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as BNA REPORT).
5. See infra note 82.
6. See, e.g., Mennemeier, Protection from Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982); Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for Persons Discharged from Private
Employment, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 313 (1979); Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employers to
Terminate At-Will Employees, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 633 (1982); St. Antoine, You're Fired!, JO
HuM. RTS. 32 (1982); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
7. Payne v. Western & A. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). This rule was first enunciated in the
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and employee were based upon status principles rather than contract
law. 8 Like the feudal bond between lord and tenant or master and
servant, the relationship of employer and employee was deemed to imµose reciprocal rights and duties protective of both parties. These statusoriented principles, however, were ill-suited to the economic conditions
of the time. The late nineteenth century was a period of tremendous
industrial growth and intense competition 9 in which employers needed
the ability to adjust the size of their workforce quickly to meet fluctuating market demands at a competitive cost. 10
The law soon granted employers this power by reformulating the
foundations of employment; rather than viewing the employer-employee
relationship as status-based, courts began to consider the relationship
as contractually based. This shift was consonant with prevailing laissezfaire principles that advocated free economic competition as a means
of attaining broad social benefits. 11 The effects were simple and direct;
as long as an employer had not agreed to hire an employee for a contractually specified length of time, either party could terminate the relationship "at-will." It was thus presumed that each party was free to
contract for a specified term, and failure to do so indicated a mutual
desire to retain the freedom to end the contract at any time. 12
Doctrines of mutuality of obligation and consideration were used
to provide additional support for the at-will rule. Applying the mutuality
doctrine, courts held that if the employee could quit his job at any
treatise H. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). Although Wood cited four cases
as authority, none actually supported his proposition. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 476 (1921).
8. See generally, 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258-66 (1832); P. SELZNICK,
LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123-30 (1969); Feinman, The Development of the Employment At-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. ll8, 119-22 (1976); Note, A Common Law Action
for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Common Law Action]; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-25 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Protecting Employees].
9. See Feinman, supra note 8, at 133-34; Note, Common Law Action, supra note 8, at 1440-41.
10. See Feinman, supra note 8, at 133-34; Vernon & Gray, Termination At-Will - The
Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EMP. REL. L.J. 25, 26-27 (1980).
11. See]. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY U.S.
3-32 (1956); Note, Common Law Action, supra note 8, at 1442; Note, Protecting Employees,
supra note 8, at 1826.
12. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 8, at 131; Note, Protecting Employees, supra note 8, at
1825; cf. Feinman, supra note 8, at 130 (suggesting that this presumption was not based on
a contractual model of intent, but on a pragmatic concern of the judiciary that employers be
given full control over their workforce). This approach assumed there would be a rough equality
of bargaining power. See generally Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). Ironically,
the presumption became strong enough to induce courts to rule that employment contractually
specified as "permanent" was legally indefinite. See, e.g., Lord. v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22
P. 1126 (1889); Faulkner v. Des Moines Drug Co., ll7 Iowa 120, 90 N.W. 585 (1902); Perry
v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541 (1877); Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A. Ry., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W.
756 (1904). See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
345 (1974).
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time for any reason, so too should the employer have the right to fire
the employee for any reason. 13 An employee could offer additional
consideration for the right not to be fired at will. Yet, daily wages
were generally held to be full consideration for daily and accrued services
and consequently it was difficult for the employee to show he had provided such additional consideration. 14
During the twentieth century, legislators and courts began to recognize
that the free economic competition encouraged by laissez-faire economics
and formalistic contract law had resulted in a disparity of bargaining
power between the individual employee and large industrial employers.
Congress acted first, passing legislation designed to equalize bargaining
power by aiding employee organization. 15 Under this legislation culminating in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 16 - many
private sector employees were able to obtain job security through collective bargaining provisions allowing dismissal only for "just cause." 11
Similar rights were soon granted by state legislatures to employees not

13. See, e.g., Meadows v. Radio Indus., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Lord v. Goldberg,
81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889); Hope v. National Airlines Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. App. 1957),
cert. denied, 102 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1958); Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R. Co., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So.
585 (1924). See also Blades, supra note 2, at 1419-21; Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 53-54; Note,
supra note 12, at 342 n.58.
14. See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936) (finding employee's surrender of own business to enter long-term employment contract was not sufficient consideration to support job security); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark.
398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897) (employment contract held not binding where employee gave no additional consideration for job security provision); see also Blades, supra note 2, at 1420; Note,
supra note 12, at 342 n.58; Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 CoLUM.
L. REV. 107, 119-20 (1942).
15. In 1898, Congress passed the Erdman Act outlawing "yellow dog" contracts in the railway
industry. Ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898). Although the "yellow dog" provision was subsequently
nullified by the Supreme Court in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), additional reform
legislation soon followed; the Newlands Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed 1926) (current
version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1976)) (establishing a permanent board of mediation and conciliation for railroad labor disputes); the Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721, (current
version at 45 U.S.C. § 65 (1976)), upheld in Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (establishing
the eight-hour day); the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1926) (mediation for adjustment of railway disputes); the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932) (forbidding
federal court injunctions of peaceful collective employee action); and finally, the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). All of this legislation reflected a repudiation of
the economic and legal principles underlying the at-will rule. The view that free competition
would benefit all members of society was firmly rejected, along with the notion that formalistic
contract law could be applied to the employment setting. Since the passage of this legislation,
mutuality of obligation and consideration problems have also given way; the employer's freedom
to dismiss employees has been curtailed by collective bargaining, yet employees are still free to
quit at any time for any reason. See Summers, supra note 6, at 492.
16. 29 U .S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
17. Ninety-six percent of collective bargaining agreements have provisions concerning discharge
and discipline. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 40: I, at 63 (Dec. 28,
1978) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (BNA)]. Yet, as noted earlier, unionized
employees constitute less than 22% of the total workforce. See supra note I.
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within the jurisdiction of federal laws. 18 In addition, public sector
employees received protection, first under civil service laws, 19 and later
under constitutional due process protections 20 and federal and state
public employee bargaining laws. 21
Although these laws continue to provide important protection for
many workers, sixty to sixty-five percent of American workers are ineligible for coverage because they are neither organized nor public
employees. Thus, the majority of workers do not have any form of
comprehensive job protection. 22 The only protection they receive stems
from a patchwork of narrow legislation aimed at safeguarding limited
classes of employees. 23 As a result, these individuals are often terminated
unfairly and without recourse. The consequences of such discharges
may be serious. Workers today are highly dependent upon steady
employment; 24 frequently having developed only limited skills, they may
experience severe difficulty in obtaining new work if fired. 25 Employees
18. Forty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have laws sanctioning collective
bargaining. The following states do not: Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. [l State Laws] LAB.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 40,355, at 51,512-13 (1982).
19. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7514 (Supp. II 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.807
(Supp. 1982).
20. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972). See generally Note, Substantive Due Process: The Extent of Public Employees
Protection from Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REY. 1647 (1974).
21. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1978). Thirty-two states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico have statutes encouraging collective bargaining for public employees. The following
states do not: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah,
Virginia, and West Virginia. l PuB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 1 200.20, at 829-31
(1979). See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.209 (1979).
22. See supra note l and accompanying text.
23. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980), statutory protection is extended to employees who have received discriminatory
treatment because of their race, color, religion, national origin or sex. Id. § 2000e-2(a). Similar
protection is provided in state statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1974); CAL. LABOR
CoDE § 1420(a) (West Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1982). Employees
are also protected from discriminatory treatment based on age, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1970); physical handicaps, see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 1420(a) (West Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1983); or political affiliations, see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CoDE § 1102 (West 1971). In addition, statutory protection has
been extended to veterans, see, e.g., Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 459(b)
(1976); and debtors, Consumer Creditor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976). Dismissal
is also prohibited where employees have filed claims under the Occupational Health & Safety
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976), or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)3 (1976).
24. Fewer opportunities for self-employment as well as an increased demand for 'specialization have contributed to this dependency. As one commentator has noted; "We have become
a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most
of our people have become completely dependent upon wages . . . . For our generation, the
substance of life is in another man's hands." F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
See also Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay
on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REv. 457, 475-79 (1979).
25. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 55 & n.28; Blades, supra note 2, at 1405 & n.9.
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who lose their jobs also lose entitlement to seniority and retirement
benefits. 26 Moreover, job loss can have severe psychological conse.quences; an employee's social standing and self-esteem inevitably
suffer, 21 and he may feel stigmatized when seeking new employment. 28
All of these factors point to the need to provide protection against
unjust dismissal.

B.

Current Attempts at Judicial Reform

1. Judicial Exceptions- Some courts have developed theories based
on contract law, public policy, and tort law to ameliorate the harshness of the at-will rule. 29 None of these theories, ~owever, provides
adequate protection for job security.
26. See Glendon & Lev, supra note 24, at 476-77; Note, Common Law Action, supra note
8, at 1445.
27. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, WORK
IN AMERICA 4-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WORK IN AMERICA].
28. See Peck, supra note I, at 4-7; BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
29. Courts in 29 states have granted exceptions to the at-will rule. BNA REPORT, supra note
5, at 8. These states include California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia (federal bankruptcy court), Washington, and West
Virginia. In addition, courts in Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Iowa, Mississippi,
and Vermont have specifically left open the possibility of permitting exceptions under certain
circumstances. But see ABA COMM. ON DEV. OF THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESP.
IN THE WORKPLACE, ABA SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW I, 16 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA
COMMITTEE REPORT), for a somewhat different classification of the states granting exceptions
to the at-will rule. For an excellent survey of case law development in this area, see DeGiuseppe,
The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe
Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. I (1981-82).
Although cases generally can be divided into three areas for analytical purposes, there are
a number of instances where the courts or the parties fail to distinguish accurately the theory
upon which they are suing. For example, in Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
553 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1977), the plaintiff brought a suit in contract. The court, however, found
the discharge was motivated by malice, a traditional tort element. In Savodnik v. Korvettes,
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the court recognized a tort cause of action for breach
of an implied covenant (contract) of good faith and fair dealing. A few years earlier in the
landmark case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), the plaintiff
asked for mental suffering damages (only given in tort actions) in a suit based on contract theory.
In many cases, neither contract nor tort theory is mentioned by the plaintiff or the court.
Suit is simply brought for "wrongful discharge," "abusive discharge," "malicious discharge,"
or the like. In these cases, it is difficult to discern what standards - if any - the courts are
using to determine if an actionable wrong has taken place. See, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply
Co., 117 Ariz. 507,573 P.2d 907 (1977) (wrongful termination); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (wrongful discharge); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562,
409 A.2d 581 (1979) (wrongful discharge without cause, in bad faith, with malice, and in retaliation for employee's assertion of her rights); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d
536 (1980) (wrongful discharge).
A few employees have also brought unjust dismissal actions based on antitrust law and courts
have granted standing. See, e.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus. 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977)
(antitrust violation alleged when salesman in a restricted territory was fired for breaching agree-
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a. Contract analysis- Because there typically is no written contract in at-will employment situations, 30 courts have experienced difficulty applying traditional contract principles. 31 Consequently, courts
have been forced to use various techniques to imply a promise by the
employer to dismiss only for good cause. First, some courts have looked
for evidence that a promise to dismiss only for just cause was part
of the original employment agreement. 32 In Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Michigan, 33 for example, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that oral representations of job security and written statements in the
employee policy manual had become part of the employment contract. 34
The employees, therefore, had a legitimate expectation of continued
employment even though some had never read the manual. 35 The more
common situation, however, is for courts to treat these representations
as policy statements that are not contractually binding and subject to
change at any time without notice by the employer. 36 Regardless,
ment not to work as representative for any other furniture companies); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp.,
490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (employees alleging agreement among employer and purchaser of its division's assets not to rehire any of employer's former managerial employees);
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (employee alleging discharge for
refusing to participate in special pricing arrangements with certain customers).
30. If a written contract does exist, it is for an indefinite period, and likewise does not afford
the employee just cause protection.
31. One commentator has argued that courts broadly construing contract law would be able
to provide adequate relief to unjustly dismissed employees. Note, supra note 12. The author
reasons that an employee confers certain benefits on the employer by long years of service, and
further, that pension and health care benefits accruing over a period of time are a form of deferred compensation that the employer retains when the work relationship ends. Id. at 262-64. Yet,
this argument does not account fully for the difficulties courts face in applying the technicalities
of contract law to unjust dismissal situations. Courts constrained by innumerable cases reaffirming the at-will doctrine are unwilling - in the majority of cases - to liberalize their interpretations of consideration principles and implied contract terms to grant relief t.o unjustly dismissed
employees. See infra notes 32-47 and accompanying text. As Summers, supra note 6, at 521,
put it, "the courts have thus far shown an unwillingness to break through their self-created
crust of legal doctrine." Furthermore, because the fact situations involved do not conform to
contract formulae without a great deal of manipulation, contract theory is unlikely in the future
to become a major source of relief for unfairly treated employees. But see Note, Challenging
The Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
449 (1983).
32. See, e.g., Sartin v. City of Columbus Utils. Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Miss.
1976) (requiring evidence of promise of continued employment in the employer's retirement plan);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (finding evidence
to support implied promise of continued employment in assurances plaintiff received and employer's
acknowledged personnel policies to terminate only for just cause); Hepp v. Lockheed-California
Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978) (allowing a contract cause of action where
laid-off employee was not rehired according to company's policy of rehiring employees when
openings became available); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Beal v. K. H. Stephenson Supply Co. 36 N.C. App. 505, 244 S.E.2d
463 (1978) (parole evidence used to establish parties agreed employee would continue to work
for three years).
33. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
34. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
35. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
36. See, e.g., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976);
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employers can avoid giving employees even the smallest measure of
job security in a number of ways: they can force employees to sign
statements acknowledging that the employees may be dismissed at will;
they can remove all reference to just cause or job security from employee
manuals; or they can simply announce that their policies are subject
to unilateral change. 37
Second, many courts will imply a promise to dismiss for good cause
if the employee confers extra consideration on the employer. Js In actual
practice this means that the employee must provide the employer with
more than a day's labor. Courts have strictly construed "additional
consideration" to mean something with monetary value. Thus, courts
have indicated that extra consideration exists where an employee
transfers property to the employer's business, 39 transfers his business
to the employer, gives up his business to work for the employer, 40 or
waives a tort claim or other cause of action in return for a promise
of continued employment. 41 Other types of extra consideration may
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Mau v. Omaha Nat'I Bank, 207
Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980).
37. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d
880, 894-95 (1980). The Toussaint court recommended that employers specifically state in their
employment manuals that employment policies are subject to unilateral change by the employer.
A similar recommendation has been made by authorities in labor Jaw. See, e.g., BNA REPORT,
supra note 5, at 19-20 (remarks of Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. delivered at the American Bar Association's Media Labor Law Seminar in Washington, D.C., February 1982, proposing the elimination of both grievance procedures and reasons for discharge from employee manuals); id. at
21 (interview with Barbara Brown, member, Pepper, Hamilton, Scheetz, Washington, D.C., recommending that employers omit references to "tenure," "right to continue," "career position,"
and "permanency" from personnel manuals, brochures, and offer letters).
38. See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936) (recognizing rights of employees to permanent employment if they have given additional consideration);
Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d 193 (1942) (upholding an exception to the at-will rule
when the employee has given independent consideration); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88
Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (additional consideration needed to find an exception to
the at-will rule); Note, Protecting Employees, supra note 8, at 1819.
The requirement of additional consideration stems from theories of consideration that prevailed
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155
(1972) (holding plaintiff's gift of stock valued at $350,000 to be extra consideration); Lopp v.
Peerless Serum Co., 382 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1964) (holding plaintiff's transfer of property to
employer's business to be sufficient additional consideration).
40. See, e.g., Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1980) (holding plaintiff's transfer
of manufacturing business to the employer to be sufficient additional consideration for the guarantee
of lifetime employment); Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d 193 (1942) (employee who gave
up his business to work for employer provided independent consideration). Contra Orsini v.
Trojan Steel Corp., 219 S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951) (employee who gave up his job to work
for employer did not give independent consideration); Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d
1156 (4th Cir. 1982) (employee who gave up a job with union benefits for a management position had not given sufficient consideration for promise of permanent employment).
41. See, e.g., Eggers v. Armour & Co., 129 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1942) (stating in dicta
that a contract for life employment may be made in consideration of settlement of a claim for
damages); Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (stating in
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also protect the employee from termination at will when combined with
some evidence of an implied promise in the original employment
contract. 42 As a general matter, however, it is very difficult for an
employee to show that more consideration has been given to an employer
than the value of the wages received. 43
Third, some courts recently have held that employees discharged on
the eve of the accrual of benefits are protected by an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing that exists in all employment contracts. 44
This theory applies to long-term employees who are approaching the
vesting of pension or other benefits 4 ' as well as to salespeople whose
dicta that relinquishment of the right to recover for damages suffered would be sufficient consideration for the promise of continued employment); Morris v. Park Newspapers of Ga. 149
Ga. App. 674,255 S.E.2d 131 (1979) (denying employee who purchased a vehicle and equipment
to run a distributorship and was later fired recovery because of state failure to recognize doctrine
of additional consideration).
42. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980) (finding an action for breach of implied covenant of good faith based on the length of
the employee's service and an employer policy to utilize certain procedures); Rabago-Alvarez
v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976) (finding plaintiff's employment
not terminable at will because of oral guarantees to terminate only for good cause and if independent consideration exists); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(trier of fact may conclude that employer meant to extend employment contract for a reasonable
time if the employee can show reliance on such representations by his superiors and/or that
his sacrifice of other job offers constituted additional consideration).
43. See, e.g., Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (finding no additional consideration where the plaintiff, a pilot, continued to work through a strike
after assurances that he could keep his job as long as the company was in business); Bullock
v. Dese.et Dodge Truck Center, Inc., II Utah 2d I, 354 P.2d 559 (1960) (no additional consideration found where the employee took a reduction in salary, incurred expenses in moving
to job site, and lost other benefits).
At least one court has ignored the requirement of additional consideration. See Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (holding no additional consideration required for a "permanent" contract).
44. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980) (fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation held violative of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists in at-will employment settings); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P .2d 1063
(Mont. 1982) (good faith and fair dealing required in at-will employment situations; failure to
comply with employee handbook policies may violate this duty); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (dismissal of employee based on her refusal to date her
foreman was not in good faith); DeGiuseppe, supra note 29, at 27-30; Murg & Sharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 362-63 (1982).
See also Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981)
(analyzing implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in terms of public policy torts).
45. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 131 (1982) (finding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on length
of employee service and statements made in personnel manual); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied from
employee's 32 years of service); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied from employee's 18 years
of service and acknowledged employer policies regarding procedures for settling employment
disputes); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) (acting in good faith
includes not reneging on policy of paying for unused vacation time and providing severance
pay at termination).
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income depends on commissions earned in a previous year. 46 The
covenant concept, however, has not been widely used, and a mere showing that an employee was discharged near the time when benefits would
have vested may be insufficient to trigger liability on the part of the
employer. 41
b. Public policy analysis- Some courts have recognized an exception to the at-will rule where the employer has violated public policy
in dismissing the employee. 48 Public policy exceptions, for example,
have been applied where an employee was discharged because of opposition to illegal or unethical activities, 49 exercise of a statutory right, 50
refusal to take a polygraph test, 51 or service on a jury. 52 Courts, however,
frequently limit application of the public policy exception to instances
46. See, e.g., Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 422 N.E.2d 1379 (Mass. App. 1981),
modified on appeal, 386 Mass. 877,438 N.E.2d 351 (1982) (implied covenant of good faith does
not permit an employer to dismiss an employee to avoid paying him a commission); Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing prohibits employer from terminating the employment contract to avoid paying commission to employee).
47. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (13-year employee
dismissed 7-1/2 months before pension vested could not prove reason for his discharge was solely to defeat pension benefits); cf. Kruzer v. Giant Tiger Stores, Inc., 39 Ohio Misc. 129, 173
N.E.2d 70 (1974) (22-year employee terminated two weeks before his pension was to vest failed
to prove his dismissal was designed to defeat his pension benefits).
48. The "public policy" exception has been applied in cases where the courts treat a public
policy violation as a breach of contract, as a tort, or simply as a "wrongful discharge." There
are still, however, jurisdictions that do not recognize a public policy exception to the at-will
rule. See, e.g., Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981) (upholding dismissal
where employee was fired for testifying truthfully at an administrative hearing); Segal v. Arrow
Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1978) (upholding dismissal of employee for filing a workmen's
compensation claim).
49. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,610 P.2d 1330 164 Cal. Rptr.
839, (1980) (public policy exception upheld where employee dismissed for refusing to participate in retail price fixing scheme in violation of the federal antitrust laws); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (public policy exception upheld
where employee dismissed for supplying information concerning unlawful activities of his coworkers). Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (public
policy exception upheld where employee dismissed for failure to commit perjury during an investigation of the union).
50. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (employee
had a statutory cause of action when she asserted she had been discharged for filing a workmen's
compensation claim); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(same). But see Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (employee did not state a statutory
cause of action when he claimed his dismissal was punishment for filing a workmen's compensation claim).
51. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979). But see
Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P .2d 907 (1978) (application of public policy
exception not permitted where employer fired employees for refusing to take a "psychological
stress evaluation test").
52. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (awarding damages to employee
who was fired for serving jury duty); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28,
386 A.2d 119 (1978) (employee entitled to damages if he could show that dismissal was punishment for serving on a jury).
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where employer action violates "clearly mandated public policy. " 53
Often this means that the employee must show either that a statute
prohibits the discharge and provides a civil cause of action, 54 or that
the dismissal was for refusing to participate in illegal activities. 55
This limited application of the public policy exception reflects a
general reluctance of many courts to make policy decisions if they feel
such decisions would be better left to the legislature. 56 Indeed, in several
instances where the employee was denied relief for failure to show that
the policy violated was "clearly mandated," the court explicitly stated
that recovery would have been granted if a statute existed that espoused
the specific policy in question. 57 In practice, then, it is clear that the
usefulness of the public policy exception to the at-will rule is limited
by the willingness of the legislature to enact new statutes enunciating
policies consistent with the protection of at-will employees.
c. Tort analysis- Finally, some courts have permitted an exception to the at-will rule based on tort law. 58 A variety of theories have
been advanced, 59 the most successful of which is the retaliatory discharge
53. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)
(A "clearly mandated public policy" is defined as one that "strikes at the heart of a citizen's
social rights, duties, and responsibilities."); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d
536 (1980) (employee discharged as a result of his relationship with another employee not allowed
to recover because there was no violation of a "clearly-defined, well established public policy").
54. See, e.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Conduct contravening public policy not enough to warrant creation of a judiciai remedy for wrongful dismissal;
rather the discharge must violate some well-defined public policy, and the statute stating the
policy must provide a civil remedy.); Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 110 (1967) (no recovery for employee who failed to allege that a statute prohibited his
discharge); Fawcett v. G. C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 291, 348
N.E.2d 144 (1976) (no recovery for an employee discharged in violation of an Ohio statute prohibiting discharge of employees between the ages of 40 and 65 because the statute provides no
remedy for its breach).
55. See supra note 49; Murg & Sharman, supra note 44, at 347. Indeed, if an employee
does not allege an explicitly illegal act was involved, a court is not likely to find a public policy
exception. ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
56. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1981) (Public policy exceptions and covenants of good faith and fair dealing must be adopted by the state legislature
or the Supreme Court before the Tennessee courts will recognize them.).
51. See, e.g., Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977) (employee discharged for announcing he would attend night law school not permitted to recover on public
policy grounds because the latter is a matter for legislative determination); Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (no clear violation of public policy where employee
discharged for informing his superiors that a product he was supposed to sell had not been properly tested and was dangerous).
58. Tort theory has been recommended by a number of commentators as the optimal protection for unjustly dismissed at-will employees. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 2, at 1413; Comm.
on Labor & Employment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36
REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170, 191-93 (1981); Note, Common Law Action, supra note 8, at 1454.
In their view, tort theory is the most flexible of the common law doctrines. This theory, however,
has not proved to be as useful as these commentators may have anticipated, largely because
of the courts' reluctance to extend existing tort law.
59. Courts have recognized such theories as malicious discharge and disinterested malevolence,

400

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 16:2

tort used to protect "whistleblowers. " 60 To recover under this theory,
employees must show they were dismissed either for reporting a violation of the law or for exercising a statutory right. 61 Some courts may
also allow this type of tort for a violation of an important public
policy. 62
In some cases, courts have granted relief for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional harm. 63 Under this theory, an employee must
show that the employer's conduct was so outrageous that no person
could be expected to withstand it. 64 Establishing such a case, however,
but so far no employees have been able to recover under them. See, e.g., Perdue v. J.C. Penney
Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (disinterested malevolence); McCullough v. Certain Teed
Prod. Corp., 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1979) ("intentional tort"); Johnson v. National Beef Packaging
Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) (malicious discharge); Reale v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 311 N.Y.S.2d 767, aff'd on other grounds, 28 N.Y.2d 912,271 N.E.2d 565 (1971)
(malicious discharge); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 17 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1978) (malicious
discharge); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (wrongful
discharge); DeGiuseppe, supra note 29, at 42 (discussing the "prima Jacie tort").
60. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979) (recognizing
retaliatory discharge as a separate and independent tort).
61. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (granting
relief to employee who was discharged for exercising his right under Pennsylvania law not to
take a polygraph test); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(granting relief to employee fired for filing a workmen's compensation claim under the Indiana
workmen's compensation statute).
There is considerable overlap between judicial treatment of tort actions for "retaliatory discharge"
and the public policy exception. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d
124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (holding that employer who discharged employee for supplying information to police regarding criminal activities of his co-workers was liable in tort for a violation of public policy); Harless v. First Nat'! Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)
(holding that employer who discharged employee for reporting to his superiors that he knew
the bank had intentionally overcharged customers and yet failed to make rebates was liable in
tort for a violation of public policy).
62. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981)
(granting relief to employee discharged in retaliation for filing a personal injury suit); Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (allowing
tort cause of action to employee discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal price fixing
scheme). But see Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710
(1982) (no recovery in tort for discharge in retaliation for refusing to violate the Code of Ethics
of the Institute of Internal Auditors; the court stated that this ethical code did not establish
a public policy); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,319 A.2d 174 (1974) (upholding
discharge of employee who complained about the marketing of a dangerous product); Pierce
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,417 A.2d 505 (1980) (upholding constructive discharge
of employee who quit after being demoted for refusing to do research on the grounds that it
violated her interpretation of the Hippocratic oath).
63. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (firing
of employees in alphabetical order to extract information concerning alleged stealing held to
be intentional infliction of emotional harm); Kissinger v. Mannor, 92 Mich. App. 572,285 N.W.2d
214 (1979) (refusal to permit employee to use bathroom held to be intentional infliction of emotional harm despite availability of workmen's compensation); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 86
Cal. Rptr. 88, 460 P.2d 216 (1970) (racial slurs constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Contreras v. Crown-Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735,565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (same).
64. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 comment j (1965). The defendant's
conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
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poses significant problems of proof. 65
As a general matter, however, courts are reluctant to grant relief
in these cases because of the nature of the at-will doctrine; the employer
has no obligation to the employee, and it is, therefore, difficult to
find the breach of duty required in most other tort cases. 66 Moreover,
all tort theories based on public policy violations - like the public
policy exception itself - are applicable only in instances where the
employer's actions breach a clear judicial or legislative mandate.
2. Systemic problems- Although each of the judicially created exceptions to the at-will rule has proved inadequate in providing protection for job security, the problem may lie more with the judicial natur_e
of the remedy sought than with the particular theory upon which the
exception is based. Certain systemic problems are common to all judicially created, as opposed to legislatively created, remedies. To begin with,
courts have been inconsistent in their application of judicial exceptions.
Some jurisdictions allow contract, tort, and public policy exceptions,
while other jurisdictions only allow one of the three. This inconsistency is significant when it comes to evaluating the damages to which
an unjustly dismissed employee is entitled. Under a contract theory,
an employee would be entitled to back pay, lost benefits, and possibly
reinstatement. 67 A successful plaintiff in a tort action, however, may
- in addition to these damages - be entitled to punitive or mental
suffering damages. 68 Yet, for a plaintiff suing under a more general
public policy exception theory, there are no guidelines for determining
the nature of the court's award. In short, because the law is unsettled,
employers will have difficulty anticipating both when and to what extent they may be liable.
Furthermore, using a judicially created exception to resolve unjust
dismissal cases creates significant yroblems of proof for employees.
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." Id. comment d.
65. See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Richey
v. American Auto. Assoc., 406 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. App. 1980).
66. See, e.g., Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (employer did not breach any
duty owed to the employee in firing him for filing a workmen's compensation claim); DeMarco
v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (employer breached
no duty owed to employee in firing him for refusing to withdraw a personal injury suit against
the employer).
67. See, e.g., Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877,438 N.E.2d 351 (1982)
(awarding employee compensatory damages in the amount he expected to be paid as commissions); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (awarding compensatory damages to employee).
68. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming
lower court award of punitive damages in tort for the breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51
Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N .E.2d 1145 (1977) (holding that retaliatory discharge gave rise to an
action in tort for compensatory and punitive damages).
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For example, to establish that a discharge is unjust, an employee must
have information regarding company policies that is not readily available. Often the employee will only know what happened in his own
area of the employer's business. The employee may be unaware of information that is critical to an accurate determination of whether the
employer's practices constitute a business-related justification. Thus,
even where a court permits an exception to the at-will rule, the employee
must overcome significant burdens if he is to triumph. 69
In addition, problems of judicial administration make courts unsuitable for resolving dismissal cases. First, the traditional courtroom
setting and procedure are too formal. Employees, unversed in the
technicalities of using courts to assert their rights and generally convinced
that judges sympathize with employer sentiments, may be inhibited from
bringing their claims to court. 70 Moreover, the formalities of the courtroom heighten adversarial reactions that may make it difficult to reestablish a good working relationship if reinstatement is ordered as
a remedy. 11
Second, court delays and backlogs - which have already reached intolerable proportions 12 - pose special problems in the employment
setting. Long delays intensify antagonistic feelings and undercut settlement possibilities, 73 thereby significantly diminishing the opportunity
for reinstatement. In addition, delays cause hardship for the many
employees who are unlikely to find alternative work while waiting for
their cases to come to court. Employers, too, may be harmed; long
delays followed by a trial resulting in a back-pay award force the
employer to pay large sums of money for which no services have been
rendered. 74
Third, the costs of court adjudication, for both the public as a whole
69. See, e.g., Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489,265 N.W.2d 385 (1978)
(denying relief to employee who failed to prove that he had been fired for refusing to alter
pollution control reports); Kruzer v. Giant Tiger Stores, Inc., 39 Ohio Misc. 129, 317 N.E.2d
70 (1974) (22-year employee dismissed two weeks before his pension was to vest could not prove
he was fired to defeat his pension benefits).
70. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 65-66.
71. Id. at 66-67.
72. See generally Ryan, Lipetz & Neubauer, Analyzing Court Delay Reduction Programs:
Why do Some Succeed?, 65 Juo1cATURE 58 (1981); Olson, Controlling Litigation Costs: Some
Proposals for Reform, 2 LITIGATION, Summer 1976, at 16.
73. Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 67; cf. Gregory & Rooney, Grievance Mediation: A Trend
in the Cost Conscious Eighties, 31 LAB. L.J. 502, 505 (1980) (noting that in labor arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements "[t]ime delays, for any reason, may widen the rift between the parties and harm present and future relations").
74. Cf. Seitz, Delay: The Asp in the Bosom of Arbitration, 36 ARB. J., Sept. 1981, at 29
(1981) (discussing the problem of delay-inflated back pay awards in arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements).
These delays will only become more serious as employees realize they may have a cause of
action for unjust dismissal and bring suits in greater numbers.
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and the individual parties, make the courts an impractical forum for
dismissal cases. If judicial remedies were readily available, unjust
dismissal cases would flood the courts, requiring an expansion of the
court system at enormous cost to the public. 75 These extra costs would
come at a time when court expenditures are already viewed as overly
burdensome. As a result, courts would not receive the funding necessary
to deal effectively with dismissal cases. Delays, and their attendant problems, would only increase.
Costs to the individual parties are also likely to impose significant
barriers. Going to court requires paying for an attorney, discovery,
and witnesses. For an employee who has just lost his job, these expenses
are overwhelming. Indeed, an employee may feel that any savings must
be applied toward finding new employment rather than risked by exercising a right to sue.
II.

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: MEDIATION-ARBITRATION

Judicial failure to provide adequate protection for at-will employees
is not the result of societal objections to reform of the at-will rule. 16
Indeed, the employment security enjoyed by unionized and public
employees has long been accepted as a productive solution to dismissal
disputes. 11 The real difficulty is that courts are not equipped to provide the necessary protection.
The obvious way around this problem - as commentators have
pointed out - is to establish statutory rather than judicial protection
for at-will employees. 78 Several efforts at developing such a solution
have already been made. On the federal level, it was proposed that
unjust dismissal be made an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. 79
This bill, which was rejected the same term it was introduced, had
several impractical features. By adopting the jurisdictional exclusions
of the NLRA, the bill would have left a large number of deserving
employees without coverage. 80 Moreover, utilizing NLRA procedures
75. Professor Stieber and Professor Summers both estimate that 200,000 employees are unjustly dismissed each year. BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 24-25. Even if only one-quarter to
one-half of these employees were to bring suit an expansion of judicial resources would be required.
76. Current employment law rejects the legal concepts that once supported the at-will rule.
See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
77. Job security "has earned acceptance as an essential element of a tolerable and humane
employment relation, and it expresses an increasing recognition that employees have valuable
rights in their jobs that society ought to protect against arbitrary action." Summers, supra note
6, at 520.
78. See generally Mennemeier, supra note 6; St. Antoine, supra note 6; Summers, supra note 6.
79. Corporate Democracy Act, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
80. The NLRA is not applied to employees working for employers doing insufficient business
to meet the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdictional standards. See R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 48-50 (6th ed. 1979).
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would have been prohibitively expensive. 81 On the state level, legislation
has been proposed in Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 82 These proposed bills, however, have
serious flaws. Some retain the expense and inefficiency of court
adjudication, 83 while others, though recognizing the benefits of an alternative means of dispute resolution, do not provide for sufficiently
economical procedures. 84
The statute proposed in this part of the Note goes beyond existing
bills. It is designed to provide quick, fair, and effective relief for the
widest range of employees possible while avoiding the problems encountered in state and federal proposals.

A.

Operation of the Model Statute: An Overview

The proposed model statute applies existing just cause standards
developed under collective bargaining agreements through unified
mediation-arbitration proceedings. Under this plan, claims are presented
by the parties to a single mediator-arbitrator. The proceedings are informal; rules of evidence are relaxed and the parties are free to state
their claims without attorney representation. The mediator-arbitrator
is expected to take an active role, asking questions and clarifying issues
as each party makes its case.
Upon completion of both presentations, the parties recess while the
mediator-arbitrator makes a preliminary assessment of the case. The
In addition, certain types of employees - including all supervisory agricultural and domestic
workers - are statutorily excluded from coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
81. The investigative and adjudicative costs of the National Labor Relations Board are paid
by the government. By utilizing Board procedures then, the cost of settling dismissal disputes
would rest entirely on the public. This contrasts sharply with the alternative mechanisms proposed in this Note and various state bills. These mechanisms would minimize public expense
by localizing the cost of resolution on the parties to the dispute.
82. Colorado: H. B. No. 1485, 53d Gen.. Ass. 1st Reg. Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as
the Colorado bill]; Connecticut: Comm. B. No. 5151 (Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations), Gen. Ass. Jan. Sess. (1975) (hereinafter cited as the Connecticut bill]; Michigan: H. B.
No. 5892 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Michigan bill]; New Jersey: Ass. B. No. 1832, (1980)
[hereinafter cited as the New Jersey bill]; Pennsylvania: H.B. No. 1742, Gen. Ass. Sess. (1981)
[hereinafter cited as the Pennsylvania bill]; Wisconsin: noted in BNA REPORT, supra note 5,
at 12 [hereinafter cited as the Wisconsin bill]. In addition to these proposals, limited protective
legislation has actually been passed in South Dakota and Puerto Rico. The South Dakota law
creates a presumption that a person hired on a yearly salary is hired for a year. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN.§ 60-1-3 (1978). Termination before the year ends requires the employer to demonstrate
that the dismissal resulted from "habitual neglect of duty or continued incapacity to perform
or any willful breach of duty by the employer." Id.. § 60-4-5 (1978). The Puerto Rican statute
provides that an employee dismissed without cause is entitled to an indemnity of one month's
salary and an additional progressive indemnity equivalent to one week for each year of service.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185(a-c) (1976).
83. See the Colorado and New Jersey bills, supra note 82.
84. See the Connecticut, Michigan, and Pennsylvania bills, supra note 82.
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parties then reconvene and commence mediation. ss At this point, to
facilitate mediation, the mediator-arbitrator is permitted to give his
initial impressions of the case based on the evidence that has been
presented. If after a reasonable time the mediator-arbitrator concludes
that no settlement is possible, he is required to adjourn the proceedings
and, within thirty days, write an opinion deciding whether the employee
was dismissed for "just cause." The mediator-arbitrator's decision will
be based on the law of unjust dismissal as it has deyeloped in arbitration under collective bargaining agreements and in cases decided under
this statute. These earlier opinions, however, are non-binding and leave
the mediator-arbitrator free to tailor an award to the particular facts
of a case.
Although the mediator-arbitrator's decisions are binding, they are
also appealable to the local state court of general jurisdiction. On review
the court will decide whether the award is supported by "substantial
evidence," yet in practice the courts are expected to give broad deference
to the mediator-arbitrator's evaluation of the merits of the dispute.

B.

Advantages of the Model Statute: An Overview

The proposed statute is similar to many of the state bills in that
it utilizes the law of unjust dismissal developed under collective bargaining agreements as a basic standard for evaluating claims. 86 This
statute also follows some of the state proposals in the broad sense that
it removes dismissal disputes from the courts. 87
85. Commentators have debated whether an individual who has the power to resolve a dispute
by rendering an arbitration award should be allowed to mediate between the parties prior to
making a final decision. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 78-80 (3d
ed. 1973); Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, in BNA, THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION 20, 35 (1957) (arguing that mediation should be a part of the arbitrator's work in resolving disputes); O'Connell, Should the Scope of Arbitration Be Restricted,
18 PROC. ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 102, 103-04 (1965) (arguing that allowing arbitrators
to mediate confuses the arbitrator's role and causes him to make decisions beyond the scope
of authority granted him by the parties).
The concerns underlying this debate are inapposite in the context of a statutory remedy that
does not apply to collective bargaining agreements. There is no danger that the arbitrator will
overstep the boundaries of authority granted him by the parties because his authority is derived
from a legislative act, not an agreement made by the parties.
86. The standards developed in arbitrating dismissal disputes under collective bargaining
agreements are designed to preserve the employer's prerogative to manage while prohibiting arbitrary or unequal treatment of employees. For a full discussion of the general principles behind
these standards, see Summi:rs, supra note 6, at 499-508. For a discussion of how just cause
standards currently operate under collective bargaining agreements, see generally D. BEELER,
DISCIPLINE & DISCHARGE (1978).
87. See, e.g., Connecticut bill, supra note 82 (proposing establishment of an administrative
board to resolve dismissal disputes); Michigan bill, supra note 82 (proposing separate mediation
and arbitration procedures); New Jersey bill, supra note 82 (proposing utilization of existing
labor relations dispute resolution mechanism); Pennsylvania bill, supra note 82 (proposing separate
mediation and arbitration procedures).
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Yet, the statute has advantages not found in any of the existing proposals. First, combining mediation and arbitration maximizes the
possibility of settlement. After the parties have presented their cases,
they have a more realistic perception of the weaknesses in their respective positions and are likely to be less confident that the mediatorarbitrator would rule in their favor. 88 Parties in this situation are more
likely to strive earnestly to reach an agreement through mediation than
they would be in a separate mediation hearing where their confidence
is not tested by the prospect of an imminent arbitration ruling.
Second, mediation-arbitration is designed to encourage self-imposed
remedies. The mediator-arbitrator's role is that of a catalyst; an award
is imposed only when parties have clearly manifested their intransigence. 89
This is especially important in the employment setting where parties
who work together frequently develop close ties. These ties are more
likely to survive the trauma of dismissal disputes if the parties are able
to create their own solution than if they are forced to submit to a
remedy imposed by a third party at the conclusion of adversarial
proceedings. 90
Third, the model statute is more economical than comparable state
proposals. By combining mediation and arbitration both time and money
can be saved. Ideally, under either this proposal or state proposals providing for separate hearings, the conflict would be settled early through
mediation. In that event, the time and expense involved in each method
are equivalent. Yet, in those cases where both mediation and arbitration are necessary, this proposal eliminates the burden of a second
hearing. 91 In addition, public costs are saved by charging the parties
for the proceedings. 92 Reducing delay will protect employees left jobless
88. In this respect mediation-arbitration functions exactly like traditional mediation. The chief
characteristic of that procedure, as stated by Professor Fuller, is "its capacity to reorient the
parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a
new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes
and dispositions toward one another." In this way the reorientation encourages a voluntary settlement. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971).
89. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
90. Cf. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment,
33 ME. L. REV. 237, 239 (1981) (noting that proponents of mediation claim that parties were
more satisfied with voluntary small claims mediation settlements than small claims court judgments);
Gregory & Rooney, supra note 73, at 505 (arguing that mediation settlements are easier to live
with than arbitration awards imposed by a third party). A solid employment relationship is central
to the success of reinstatement as a remedy. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
91. Aside from the obvious costs saved by eliminating this second hearing, considerable time
may be spared. This may be illustrated by comparing the time requirements of separate hearing
bills to those of the model statute. Under both the Michigan and Pennsylvania systems, supra
note 82 - notwithstanding the time for selecting the separate mediators and arbitrators - a
claim may take up to 120 days to process. In contrast, under the model statute, even after guaranteeing the parties 30 days to prepare for the hearing, the maximum time for an award would be
90 days.
92. These fees will not actually place an added burden on the parties, however, because the
attorney fees they would otherwise have to pay will be reduced or eliminated. Attorney's fees
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and may also substantially decrease an employer's backpay penalty. 93
Fourth, the model statute offers more refined employee coverage
than existing state proposals. These protections are better tailored to
the needs of both employees and employers, and extend only to those
employees whose significant interest in their jobs justifies giving them
a cause of action.
The model statute embodies these advantages while giving explicit
guidelines for conducting hearings. The statute specifies the precise process by which the parties will air their grievances and the adjudicator
will make a determination. There are also provisions defining the jurisdiction and powers of the mediator-arbitrator. These explicit guidelines
will aid legislators in drafting reform proposals capable of providing
comprehensive and effective relief. Furthermore, they will directly aid
the decisionmaker in resolving these disputes.
C.

Model Statute
PREAMBLE

An Act Prohibiting Unjust Dismissal of Employees, Providing
for Mediation-Arbitration Proceedings, and Providing for the
Enforcement and Review of Mediator-Arbitrator Awards

SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Act, the following words and phrases shall
have, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings
ascribed to them in this section:
l(a) "Employee" means a person who has either
(i) worked an average of less than twenty hours per week for
eighteen months or longer; or
(ii) worked an average of twenty or more hours per week for
six months or longer; and
(iii) is not an individual guaranteed comprehensive protection
against unjust dismissal by civil service or tenure, or an
for an unjust discharge suit under tort or public policy theories would almost certainly exceed
the basic fee for mediation-arbitration. Mediation-arbitration minimizes the costs of legal research
and planning that form the largest portion of attorney's fees. The parties do not need an attorney to brief the legal issues of the case or guide them through procedure; they simply state
the facts of the case and the mediator-arbitrator supplies the governing law. Thus, even if the
parties secure an attorney, the cost should be substantially lower than in the trial setting. See
J. FALL, A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 78 (1973).
93. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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individual whose dismissal was fully arbitrated under a collective bargaining agreement.

Comment
This section is designed to extend just cause protection to the maximum number of employees practicable. All employees except those new
to the job, protected by civil service, or subject to a collective bargaining arbitration award will be covered.
1. Probationary period- Starting employees are exempted from
coverage under the Act because the employer's need for discretion in
selecting workers outweighs the employee's claim to protection of job
security in the early stages of the work relationship. The hiring employer
can never be certain that a new employee will perform satisfactorily.
Accurate determination of whether an employee has the capability both
to handle the job and get along with other workers requires on-the-job
evaluation. Consequently, the employer must be able to fire employees
at will during the probationary period if he is to build a productive
and compatible workforce. 94 Balanced against this need is the employee's
interest in maintaining his job. That interest, however, has yet to be
developed; the recently hired employee has not demonstrated either
ability or loyalty and therefore cannot justifiably rely on the employer
to guarantee his job. Not until the employer has tacitly expressed his
approval of an employee by employing him for some time can the
worker legitimately claim a right to be protected against at-will dismissal.
Only then will the employer be presumed to have accepted the employee
and held to a just cause standard.
Preserving employer discretion during a ''probationary period'' will
benefit employees traditionally discriminated against in hiring. 95 The
employer, for example, can hire employees with minimum qualifications
knowing that he is not risking liability should it be necessary to dismiss
them shortly after beginning work. 96 Similarly, the probationary period
exemption allows the employer to hire large numbers of employees on
94. Even unionized employees are not protected from unjust dismissal during a probationary
period. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (BNA), supra note 17, § 55:61; St. Antoine, supra note
6, at 36. The bills proposed in Michigan and New Jersey, supra note 82, provide for six-month
probationary periods. The Connecticut bill, supra note 82, in effect provides for a five-year probationary period because an employee is defined as an individual employed for at least five consecutive years. The Pennsylvania and Colorado bills, supra note 82, do not provide for a probationary period.
95. Although many of those traditionally discriminated against receive special statutory protection, see supra note 23, some, such as ex-convicts, do not. These individuals will be aided
only if present fears that hiring ex-convicts entails establishing a permanent commitment are
overcome. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 82.
96. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 82.
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a temporary basis to meet short-term business demands without fear
that liability will be incurred if they are fired when demand recedes.
For full-time employees, six months should be a sufficient probationary period. 97 Part-time employment, however, requires a longer
period. Employees often seek part-time employment to fulfill shortterm needs or earn temporary income while looking for a permanent
position. Likewise, employers frequently hire part-time employees to
meet short-term business demands. Thus, for both the employee and
the employer there is not the same expectation of permanency that
is associated with full-time labor. Consequently, in the case of parttime employment it makes sense not to apply a just cause standard
until later in the relationship when it is clear that the work will be
permanent. For this reason, the statute provides an eighteen month
probationary period for part-time workers. 98
2. Civil service and tenured workers- Government employees
covered by civil service laws or tenure provisions 99 are exempted from
coverage to preserve the government's special interest in retaining control
over its workers. Extension of a state's proposal, such as this Act,
to federal employees would be prohibited as impermissible state interference with federal government activities. 100 In contrast, states have
a legitimate interest in maintaining tight control over the working conditions of their own employees. In fact, most states have enacted a
wide range of specialized regulations designed to meet the exigencies
of state employment. 101 Because these regulations are tailored to state
labor conditions, and because they usually provide employees with
substantial protection from unjust discharge, there is little need to
97. Both St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 36, and Summers, supra note 6, at 525, agree that
a six-month probationary period should be adequate. Although this period is longer than the
30, 60, or 90 day provisions most common in collective bargaining agreements, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (BNA), supra note 17, § 55:61, this is necessary to give employers not accustomed to
evaluating new employees a chance to develop confidence with the probationary system. If, at
a later date, it becomes apparent that the period is unnecessarily long, it may be shortened.
98. This provision is not found in the proposed state legislation. The Michigan and Connecticut bills, supra note 82, exclude part-time employees from coverage. The Pennsylvania, Colorado, and New Jersey bills, supra note 82, do not. In Pennsylvania and Colorado, where there
is no provision for a probationary period, it appears that part-time employees will have just
cause protection immediately upon acceptance of a job offer.
99. This group includes employees protected by federal statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7554 (1976),
and state statute, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 § 10-1-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
100. Cf. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) (state may not require a federal postal
worker driving a mail truck to carry a state driver's license); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271
U.S. 609, 613 (1926) (stating in dicta that "[i]t is elementary that the Federal government in all
its activities is independent of state control"); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943)
(holding that the supremacy clause requires that the activities of the federal government be free
from state regulation).
101. State regulation of state employment is typically designed to avoid interruption of necessary
services such as fire and police protection. See generally l Pua. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP.
(CCH) 11 400-451 (1979).
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broaden the coverage of this statute to state government workers.
3. Unionized workers- Unionized employees present a more difficult question. No objection may be raised to extending protection
to unionized employees who do not receive contractual just cause
security. 102 Failure to cover these workers would be penalizing them
for their union activity - a sanction that is clearly contrary to federal
and, in many cases, state labor policy. 103
Coverage should also be extended to employees who, though protected
under a collective bargaining agreement, are unable to obtain relief
because their union has refused to take their claim to arbitration. Although the unionized worker in this situation can sue either the employer
or the union under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act ("LMRA"), 104 it is difficult to obtain relief as courts have developed
narrow requirements for section 301 suits. In short, the employee may
be denied relief despite the fact that the dismissal claim was valid. 105
102. Before extending statutory just cause protection to unionized employees, however, it
is vital to ascertain whether state regulation of the dismissal of union workers - normally a
subject of collective bargaining agreements - would be preempted by federal labor law. Although
this issue has not been resolved conclusively by the courts, a recent article by Professor Cox
suggests that were the issue to be litigated today courts would likely determine that "the NLRA
leaves the states free to regulate employment conditions, provided that the state legislation does
not discriminate against collective bargaining." Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law
Pre-Emption, 41 Omo ST. L.J. 277,297 (1980). Professor Cox argues that the NLRA is primarily concerned with the method by which employment terms are established: "[s)erious interference
with the substitution of one method for another would not result from allowing a state to outlaw
substantive conditions of employment that the state regards as undesirable without regard to
the method by which they are established." Id. at 297. In other words, by regulating a specific
term of employment such as dismissal, the state does not directly interfere with the negotiating
method and thus does not interfere with federal labor policy.
Professor Cox acknowledges, however, that Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959),
does not support his theory. 41 OHIO ST. L.J. at 298. In Oliver, the Court held that state antitrust laws could not be applied to enjoin implementation of a collective bargaining agreement
that set wages and working conditions in violation of the state law. 358 U.S. at 295-97. Yet
Professor Cox notes that Oliver was limited in Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497
(1978), where the Court held that state pension laws could supersede contrary pension terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. 41 Omo ST. L.J. at 298-300.
Other commentators who have sided with Professor Cox include Professor St. Antoine, who
argues that extension of a state unjust dismissal statute to unionized workers would entail only
a "slight risk" to collective bargaining. See St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 36. Such a risk, he
contends, would not lead to preemption, given the current orientation of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 36. See also Summers, supra note 6, at 530 (arguing that state legislation of this type
would be "state protective legislation [which) has never been considered preempted because it
establishe[s) minimum standards for mandatory subjects of bargaining"); _cf. Note, Common
Law Action, supra note 8, at 1460-63 (suggesting that related extension of state judicial remedy
for unjust dismissal to unionized workers would not preempt federal labor policy).
103. The stated policy of the NLRA is to encourage collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1935). Similar policies may be found in many state labor laws. See generally I & 2 LAB. L.
REP. (CCH). These policies would be undercut if employees were encouraged to remain unorganized
to obtain just cause protection.
104. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1976).
105. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), requires that a wrongfully discharged employee
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By covering unionized workers caught in this position, the statute would
equalize protection and recognize the rights of all workers to job
security.
A different conclusion is required, however, where the unionized
worker has gone through the entire union grievance procedure and had
a claim rejected by an arbitrator. Arbitration carried out under a collective bargaining agreement is covered by just cause standards and
is likely to be heard by the same labor arbitrators who will serve as
mediator-arbitrators. Thus, allowing the employee to initiate statutory
action after arbitration would be granting a second and undeserved
bringing a § 301 suit against his employer prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation when processing the grievance. Id. at 186. To prove that the union breached its duty
of fair representation, Vaca requires the employee to do more than show that his claim is
meritorious; he must demonstrate that the union's conduct in handling the claim was "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that this rule "puts
an intolerable burden on employees with meritorious grievances and means they will frequently
be left with no remedy." Id. at 210. Commentators generally agree that individual employee
rights have been unfairly compromised by the Vaca rule. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed
to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REY. 1096 (1974); Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance
Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Tobias, A Plead for the Wrongfully
Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REY. 55 (1972); Note, The Individual
Worker's Right to Sue in His Own Name in a Collective Bargaining Situation, 17 S.D.L. REv.
217 (1972); Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE
L.J. 559 (1968). Many of these commentators, however, reacted against decisions - based on
Vaca - holding that negligent processing of a grievance does not constitute a breach of the
duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644 (10th
Cir. 1973); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972); Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d
231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971); Sharp v. Ryder Truck Lines, 465 F. Supp.
434 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Cooper v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 13 (S.D. Ind. 1976);
Papillon v. Hughes Printing Co., 413 F. Supp. 1313 (M.D. Pa. 1976). Although there is some
evidence that courts are becoming more sensitive to claims based on negligent union conduct,
see, e.g., Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978); Milstead v. Teamsters
Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981); Ruzicka v.
General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 3IO (6th Cir. 1975); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281,287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Ruggirello
v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976); concern for protection of individual worker's rights still exists. "Concern for the protection of worker's individual rights
is an important but overlooked aspect of federal labor policy. A need for reform in the area
of union handling of grievances is apparent." Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging
Standard of the Union's Duty in the Context of Negligent, Arbitrary or Perfunctory Grievance
Administration, 46 Mo. L. REV. 142, 162 (1981). See generally Note, Can Negligent Representation Be Fair Representation? An Alternative Approach to Gross Negligence Analysis, 30 CASE
W. RES. 537 (1980).
Extension of statutory protection against unjust dismissal to unionized workers deprived of
union representation would insure them protection in those critical instances when their job is
at stake. Furthermore, protection would be granted without weakening union control of grievances
- a result that is feared if a more stringent duty of fair representation is invoked. The union
would remain able to block frivolous claims, keep costs down, and preserve union management
relations by limiting grievances. For a discussion of the problems facing a union operating under
a strict fair representation standard, see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 601 (1956); Levine & Hollander, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation in Contract
Administration, 7 EMP. REL. L.J. 193, 205-06 (1981).
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chance to gain relief. 106 Moreover, allowing such an action would violate
federal labor policy1° 7 by undermining the finality of arbitration awards.
An additional question concerns whether union employees should
be required to exhaust union remedies before initiating statutory action.
The advantages of an exhaustion requirement include reduction of public
costs by eliminating most union cases from statutory treatment, 108 preservation of union control over internally developed grievance
P.rocedures, 109 and elimination of forum-shopping between union and
statutory remedies.
Opponents of exhaustion argue that it will encourage "sweetheart
contracts" with unions that have rigged their grievance mechanisms
so as to deny employees protection. 110 Employees, forced to use these
grievance procedures because of the exhaustion requirement, would be
left without a state statutory remedy. This argument, however, fails
to consider existing employee protections from union treatment of this
sort. First, the formation of "sweetheart contracts" between spurious
unions and employees is an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. 111
Second, the employee would likely be able to prove unfair union representation and would thus be able to bring suit against his employer
under section 301 of the LMRA. 112 Thus, any danger entailed by an
106. Cf. Summers, supra note 6, at 528 (noting that an employee should not be allowed
to pursue statutory arbitration if contractual arbitration has already taken place).
107. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1959) (holding that court scrutiny of labor arbitration awards should be minimal to further
the federal policy of making arbitration the last word in labor disputes).
108. Only in cases where the union has decided not to process the employee's grievance will
the employee be able to seek statutory relief. Union refusal to process a claim, however, will
often prove helpful to the employee insofar as it offers a good indication of whether the claim
has merit.
It is always possible, however, that a union will deliberately refuse to process dismissal claims
to reduce its own costs. Yet this fear is groundless, primarily because union employees are not
likely to tolerate loss of union representation in dismissal cases; indeed, these workers will feel
less secure defending themselves under a statute than they will having the union protect them
under the contract. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
109. Exhaustion of remedies is also required for suit under§ 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1976). See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). The§ 301 exhaustion
requirement was initially passed to further the federal policy favoring industrial self-government.
See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). Promoting union control over its own grievance procedure simultaneously
promotes industrial self-government. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
I 10. "Sweetheart" contracts exist where employers aid union organization or actually contribute financially to the union in exchange for favorable terms in collective bargaining contracts, or other special treatment.
111. The formation of "sweetheart" contracts is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)2 of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)2.
112. Union refusal to process a grievance because the union has agreed with the employer
not to process or to process negligently such claims would be a clear violation of the rule set
forth in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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exhaustion requirement is insufficient to outweigh the clear advantages
of including it in the procedure under this Act.
4. Managerial employees- Views differ over how far a statute of
this kind should extend in protecting managerial employees. Some commentators have argued that managerial employees should be excluded 1 13
because the discretionary and subjective nature of managerial work
makes it difficult to evaluate. 114 Insofar as a just cause statute offers
few objective criteria to determine whether an employee failed in his
work or was fired arbitrarily, it does not provide an answer to this
problem. In addition, some commentators argue that because managerial
employees do much to share and direct a business, restricting a business
owner's right to fire such workers would indirectly invade an "ownership" right to direct the business as he sees fit. 115
Although these arguments make a strong case for giving respect to
employer decisions concerning upper-level workers, they do not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that managerial employees must be
stripped of all coverage. In some situations, managerial and shop
workers are indistinguishable. It makes no more sense, for example,
to fire a high-level employee for serving on a jury than it does to fire
a lower-level worker for the same reason. In short, denying all coverage
to managerial employees essentially discriminates against a large
number 116 of high-level employees simply because they are capable of
the most subjective and valuable work.
The proposed statute provides protection for managerial employees
precisely to avoid this kind of unjust treatment. Indeed, the statute
is particularly well-suited to achieving this end. The mediator-arbitrator
will be well-versed in the subtleties of employment dynamics; in applying the just cause standard to managerial dismissals he will be fully
aware of the difficulties of evaluating upper-level employees and will
give wide deference to employer decisions. At the same time, employees
will be protected from purely arbitrary dismissals. 11 7
113. Some commentators contend that employers should continue to have the right to dismiss
upper-level employees at will. See, e.g., Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 79. The Michigan bill,
supra note 82, subscribes to this view; it excludes managerial employees from coverage. All other
proposed state legislation, however, provides no guidance either way.
114. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 78-80; Summers, supra note 6, at 526.
115. Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 78-79.
116. Managers and administrators constitute 11,458,000 workers out of a total workforce
of 100,683,000. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, July
1982, at 24 (1982). Of this number, approximately 3,774,000 are government employees already
covered under civil service. Id. at 75-76. Although these figures are not entirely accurate - primarily
because "managers and administrators" is not clearly defined in the statistics - they nonetheless
give an idea of how large the number of managerial employees actually is.
117. Coverage of managerial employees, though desirable, is likely to evoke considerable
concern in the business community. Employers are not likely to trust mediator-arbitrators to
make a fair determination in a dismissal controversy. As a result, it is possible that business
lobbyists will work to insure that, if a statute is passed, it excludes managerial workers. A political
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5. Confidential employees- Existing statutory proposals are divided
over whether confidential employees should be protected against unjust
dismissal. The Michigan bill excludes these employees from coverage
- apparently because the drafters copied a similar provision from the
NLRA. 118 Two concerns led to the· exclusion of confidential employees
from NLRA coverage. First, confidential employees may be faced with
a conflict of interest when negotiating under collective bargaining
agreements because of their close relationship with management. Second,
they may use their special access to confidential information to gain
an unfair advantage at the bargaining table. 119
These arguments, however, are inapposite in the ordinary unjust
dismissal setting because conflicts of interest and underhanded bargaining are not likely to occur. 120 At-will employees negotiate their employcompromise may be necessary at this point. The best compromise would be that proposed by
Professor Summers, supra note 6, at 526. Professor Summers argues that the best solution would
be to follow English law, Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 30(b), which excludes from
coverage employees working under fixed-term contracts for two years or more who agree to
waive their rights. This would allow businessmen themselves to decide who they think would
not be dismissed under a just cause rule. Whenever it became apparent that an employee's dismissal
would be problematic, the employer could resort to a fixed-term contract.
This proposal, however, could be abused by employers; two-year contracts could be used to
circumvent the ·,:,urpose of the statute. This result could be avoided by simply including in the
two-year contract a requirement that any employee fired under such a contract be given sixmonth's notice. The effect of such a requirement would be two-fold. First, employers would
be unlikely to enter set-term contracts with large numbers of employees. This kind of contract
would only be economically worthwhile where the employer was uncertain whether a mediatorarbitrator would be able to make a fair determination under a just cause standard. If the employer
was confident that an employee doing poor work would be dismissible under a just cause standard, it would be economically preferable to let the statute take effect and thus avoid paying
an employee for the six-month period after dismissal. Second, including this period would provide managerial employees hired on fixed-term contracts a form of protection. They would be
given six months in which to find a new job before pay was cut off.
Both the Michigan and the Pennsylvania bills, supra note 82, have apparently followed this
approach and excluded employees with fixed-term long-notice contracts. Although this Note
recognizes that such an exclusion may become politically necessary, it should be avoided if possible.
As noted in the text, the mediator-arbitrator will be able to make a fair determination of the
managerial employee's abilities. Moreover, even though the managerial employee would be given
some protection by the six-month's notice requirement, this protection is insubstantial when compared to that afforded by this statute.
118. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 80.
119. Id. This could pose a special problem to an employer faced with the underhanded demands
of a whole bargaining unit of confidential employees. To dismiss them all could easily incapacitate
his business. If he retained them, on the other hand, it is unclear whether he could trust them
in the future.
120. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 81; Keller & Brooks, NLRB Treatment of Confidential Employees: Renewed Confrontation with Congress and the Courts, 31 LAB. L.J. 733 (1980).
The NLRB has continued to push for inclusion of confidential employees under the NLRA,
arguing that these individuals should be afforded protection as long as they do not breach the
confidential relationship. Although the circuit courts have repeatedly struck down the Board's
interpretation of the Act, the Board has made clear its intent to continue to refuse to adopt
the courts' view - at least until the Supreme Court addresses the matter. See Peavey Co., 249
N.L.R.B. No. 110, 1980 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 17,123 (1980).
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ment terms on an individual basis that is highly informal. They do
not bargain collectively and thus normally cannot exert the same kinds
of pressure on an employer as union workers. An at-will employee
who blackmails an employer by threatening to divulge confidential information will, in all probability, be fired. If, after the termination,
the employee vindictively tries to leak information, he may be held
liable under state trade secrets law. 12 1
Yet, the proposed statute covers confidential employees not only
because the arguments for exclusion are inapplicable in the at-will context, but because such a provision actually protects the employer. There
is less chance that the employer will be confronted with the release
of confidential information by vengeful ex-employees if the employees
feel their claims will be satisfactorily addressed in a statutorily provided
hearing. 122
l(b) "Employer" means a person or organization that employs ten

or more persons.

Comment
Ideally, employee job security should not depend on the size of the
employer. Yet there are arguments against immediate application of
the statute to small businesses. First, although arbitrary employer actions
are likely to be common in the small business setting, 123 many individuals
might feel that, because the small employer has so few employees, they
all play the same major role in his business as managerial workers do
in a larger business. Consequently, to interfere with the small businessman's right to dismiss these workers would unduly interfere with
the right to control and direct his own business. 12 • Second, some people
may feel that, to be profitable, a small business demands better relations between employees than necessary in a large corporation. The
employer consequently requires an extra margin of discretion in making personnel shifts if he is to keep his business financially afloat.
Neither of these arguments, in themselves, is sufficient to block
121. "One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable
to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1934). Twenty-one states have enacted criminal
statutes regulating disclosure of trade secrets. See F. DESSEMONTET, LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNOWHow (2d rev. ed. 1976).
An employer can also enjoin an employee from divulging sensitive information. See, e.g.,
E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
122. CJ. Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 81 (noting that the opportunity to be heard in an
arbitration hearing would minimize the chance that an employee would vindictively disclose confidential information).
123. See Summers, supra note 6, at 525; St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 36.
124. See Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 83.
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coverage of smaller employers. The small businessman's need for discretion in guiding his business and maintaining good employee relations
are both factors that the mediator-arbitrator could consider in applying the just cause standard. 125
A better argument for initial exclusion of small businesses is that
experience should be gained under the statute before it is applied to
all employers. This would ensure that the mediation-arbitration mechanism is not overburdened before it is established. As efficiency and
expertise are gained, coverage may be extended. Such a step-by-step
approach is common in social legislation. Title VII, for example, was
originally applicable only to employers with twenty-five or more
employees but has now been modified to cover employers having fifteen
or more workers. 126
The model statute embodies this theory by commencing coverage
at the ten-employee level. This size limit should balance the goals of
smooth establishment of mediation-arbitration and maximum employee
coverage.
l(c) "Dismissal" means an involuntary discharge from employment. Dismissal includes constructive dismissal in the form
of a resignation that results from unreasonable action or inaction by the employer.

Comment
A definition of "dismissal" that includes constructive dismissal is
necessary if the broad protective aims of this proposal are to be realized.
Transfers, demotions, or reassignments are ordinarily made only in
response to business exigencies, but they may become punitive in
character, especially when used to force an employee to quit. The prohibitions of this statute would be emasculated if the employer could
circumvent them by humiliating an employee into resignation rather
than dismissing him outright.
This provision, however, does not permit an employee to prevail
in an unjust dismissal case whenever an employer action is merely unfavorable. The employer action must be serious enough to force the
employee to resign. Some of the just cause legislation that has been
proposed does not require that the employee resign prior to initiating

125. Cf. Summers, supra note 6, at 525 (noting that the close personal relationships of small
businesses and the problems they raise could be considered by an arbitrator applying a just cause
standard).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976) ..
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action. 121 The effect of these provisions will be to encourage frivolous
claims. Conversely, requiring resignation will force the employee to
consider carefully the chances of success prior to initiating action.
SECTION 2: .DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES
2(a) An employer shall not dismiss an employee except for just
cause.

Comment
Dismissal cases typically involve a wide variety of fact situations and
claims. A statute that attempts to enumerate the specific circumstances
and actions on which an employee could base a claim can never be
exhaustive; inevitably it will exclude situations not considered by the
legislature. To ensure full protection against unjust dismissal, a more
flexible provision is needed. The most practical standard is that of "just
cause." This standard has already been shaped by arbitration awards
under collective bargaining agreements, 128 yet at the same time its meaning is not so firmly established that it cannot be adapted to novel
circumstances.
An additional advantage of a just cause standard is that it would
require the employer to develop objective criteria with which others
may evaluate his business decisions. The employer who fails to act in
accordance with established policies will be open to accusations of
capriciousness. For example, if an employer reduces the workforce
without applying seniority principles, his actions are likely to be viewed
as discriminatory. Although, requiring the development of objective
criteria encroaches somewhat on management prerogative, it is a small
price to pay to ensure the protection of employees.
2(b) Notice- if an employer discharges an employee, or if the
employee resigns, the employer shall notify the employee by
registered mail within fifteen days after the discharge or resignation of the reasons for the termination of his or her employment and of his or her right to relief under this Act. Information contained in the notice shall be privileged and may not
be disclosed by the employer to a third party without the
employee's consent.

127.
128.

See New Jersey bill, supra note 82.
For a full discussion of the just cause standard, see D.

BEELER,

supra note 86.
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Comment
The purpose of this section is twofold: to alert all employees of their
rights under the Act, and to aid the employee in evaluating the likelihood
of prevailing should he elect to pursue an unjust dismissal claim. Consistent with the first of these goals, the statute requires the employer
to send notice even if the employee quits; to do otherwise would
jeopardize just cause protection of employees who have been constructively discharged. 129 Indeed, it is likely that an employee who feels compelled to quit because of actions taken by the employer will not realize
that he may have a cause of action under this statute and thus he has
a greater need for notification than an employee who is dismissed
outright.
As a general matter, including a written statement of the reasons
for dismissal in the notice will provide the employee with valuable insight into the motives behind the employer's decision. Consequently,
the employee will be in a better position to evaluate the merits of his
claim. Even if the employee is unable to make this .evaluation on his
own, the employer's statement will assist the employee's attorney in
assessing the claim and preparing for discovery. The end result will
be an increase in the efficiency of the mediation-arbitration process
through the creation of an additional means of screening out unnecessary, meritless claims.
The information contained in the dismissal notice should be kept
confidential so the employer is free to be explicit about the reason
for the dismissal, even if it reflects badly on the employee. Employers
should be prohibited both from disclosing information contained in
dismissal notices and from asking employees to provide such information so these notices do not become a liability to the employee when
he searches for another job. This prohibition will serve to maintain
the integrity of the notice procedure and keep confidential any reasons
for dismissal which might provoke embarassment if disclosed.
SECTION 3: FILING OF UNJUST DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS
3(a) Time for filing- An employee who believes that he or she
has been discharged in violation of section 2(a) may file in
the state court of general jurisdiction, by registered mail or
in person, a written complaint. The complaint must be filed
not later than thirty days after receipt of the employer's written notification of discharge and right to relief as provided
129. The Michigan and Pennsylvania bills, supra note 82, require that the employer send
notice to the employee upon discharge only.
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in section 2(b). The complaint shall contain the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the employer and of the
employee, the date of the employment termination, and a short
statement of the reasons for filing the complaint.

Comment
The employee is required to decide quickly whether to pursue a
remedy under this Act. 130 Holding the hearing shortly after the discharge
will optimize the possibility of reinstatement if the claim is found to
be unjust. Equally important, the employer will immediately know
whether to hire another worker or keep the position open for the
discharged employee.
Requiring the employee to file a complaint in court may necessitate
retaining an attorney. Although this may increase the cost of bringing
a suit, the total cost will not be prohibitive because mediation-arbitration
will result in faster settlements. 131 Consequently, the expenses of excessive attorney time and court costs will likely be avoided.
The information required to be included in the complaint is designed
to facilitate the job of the mediator-arbitrator and the court clerk in
arranging the mediation-arbitration proceeding pursuant to section
4(c)(l) of this Act.
3(b) Extension where notice requirements are not met- If an
employer:
(i) fails to provide the employee with notice pursuant to section 2(b) of the reasons for his termination and his or
her right to relief under this Act, or
(ii) has failed to post a copy of this Act pursuant to section
7 of this Act in a prominent place in the work area for
at least six months prior to the date of the employee's
termination,
the employee's time for filing a complaint under subsection
(a) shall be extended to ninety days.

Comment
Although the existence of this statute may become a matter of general
public knowledge within the state, extra care should be taken to en130. Other statutes, such as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), allow for 180 days to file
a claim. Although such an extended period is appropriate for advancing the type of broad social
policy embodied in Title VII, it does not give adequate deference to both the employee's and
the employer's interest in speedy claim resolution to be functional in the context of this statute.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
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sure that the employee is fully aware of his rights under the Act. Thus,
this section requires that notice be sent to the employee and that a
copy of the Act be posted in the work area. If the employer fails either
to post or send notice, this provision protects the employee by allowing hiin an additional sixty days to file a claim. The extension is limited
to sixty days both to avoid exposing the employer to liability indefinitely
and to promote quick settlement of dismissal disputes.
SECTION 4: MEDIATION-ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
4(a) Appointment of mediator-arbitrator- Upon receipt of a complaint from a discharged employee, the court shall select a
mediator-arbitrator to hear the dispute. The court may adopt,
by administrative order, a procedure for selection of mediatorarbitrators that includes the setting of minimum qualifications.

Comment
The selection of the mediator-arbitrator is placed in the hands of
the court for reasons of consistency and· convenience. Every state has
courts experienced in exercising an appointment power. It would be
difficult to identify another body presently in existence that is equally
competent to make this selection. Some states, however, may already
have executive or administrative commissions that are better equipped
to appoint a mediator-arbitrator than the courts. For this reason, any
other appropriate body may be statutorily delegated the responsibility
of making the selection. The Michigan bill, for example, provides that
the State Employment Relations Commission choose mediators and
arbitrators. Practically, this makes sense. The Employment Relations
Commission has been operating since 1939 132 and thus can make an
experienced and competent choice while simultaneously relieving an
already overburdened court system from performing yet another administrative function.
4(b) Disqualification of the mediator-arbitrator- The rule for disqualification of a mediator-arbitrator shall be the same as provided for the disqualification of a state judge.

Comment
Because the mediator-arbitrator performs the same function in
132. MICH. CoMP. LAWS§§ 423.1 - .30 (1979) (amending 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts 146 establishing
the Commission).
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presiding over hearings under this Act that a judge does in ordinary
court adjudication, it is reasonable to hold the mediator-arbitrator to
the same standard of conduct as a judge. Thus, this provision requires
that the rules for disqualification of the mediator-arbitrator be the same
as those provided in the state's judicial code of ethics.
4(c) Primary procedures(i) Once selected, the mediator-arbitrator shall designate a time
and place for the hearing. The court clerk shall send notice
to the parties not less than thirty days before the date set.

Comment
Although speedy dispute resolution is of critical importance, the
parties must have sufficient time to prepare properly for the hearing.
Thirty days is the period ordinarily granted to gather evidence and
prepare witnesses for compulsory mediation or arbitration hearings. 133
This period should also be sufficient in the similar context of mediationarbitration.
(4)(c)(ii) Within fifteen days after the mailing of notice of the
mediatiQn-arbitration hearing date, each plaintiff and each
defendant must send to the court clerk a check for $300.00
made payable to the mediator-arbitrator.

Comment
Insofar as both parties make use of mediation-arbitration to vindicate
their rights, it is equitable that the cost be evenly divided between them.
The $300 fee will be used to compensate the mediator-arbitrator for
his services. By requiring the parties to shoulder the expense of hiring
a mediator-arbitrator, the aggregate cost to the public of the entire
proceeding will be significantly diminished. Moreover, requiring the
employee to share the expense will help deter frivolous suits; the amount
is substantial enough to discourage the employee who does not seriously
believe a violation has occurred, yet it is not so substantial that it will
prevent worthy claims from being heard. 134

133. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 316.6 (granting parties thirty days prior to mediation hearing);
CAL. R .. CT. 1611 (providing thirty-days notice prior to arbitration hearing); PA. R. C1v. P.
1303 (same).
134. Although a fee of this size may in a rare instance deter an employee with a legitimate
claim from bringing suit, there is no other way to ensure equitable and just treatment to both
employees and employers.
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When there are multiple plaintiffs and defendants each individual
party will be required to pay the fee. As a practical matter, where funds
collected exceed the amount needed to compensate the mediatorarbitrator for his services, the excess should be used to help defray
other costs of the mediation-arbitration program. For example, this
fund could be used to pay the fees of indigent plaintiffs with colorable
claims. 135
(4)(c)(iii) A party who produces a witness at the mediationarbitration hearing shall pay the statutQry fees of that
witness. Where the mediator-arbitrator calls a witness pursuant to subsection 4(d)(i), or where more than one party requires the presence of the same witness, the parties
shall divide equally the fees of that witness.
(iv) At least ten days before the scheduled hearing date, each
party shall submit a list of witnesses to be called at the
hearing and one copy of all documents pertaining to the
issues in dispute to the court clerk, as well as to the opposing party or any attorney that the opposing party may
have secured. At the same time, each party may also submit to these individuals a concise brief or summary setting forth that party's factual or legal position on issues
pertinent to resolution of the dispute.

Comment
Each party will bear the cost of his own witnesses as part of the
expense of preparing the case. The fees should be set by the state
legislature on a scale commensurate with statutory fees paid to witnesses
in state court cases. This burden is imposed on the parties for two
reasons. First, it will decrease the overall cost of the proceeding to
the public. Second, it will cut down the number of witnesses asked
to appear at the hearing and thus will keep the proceeding from becoming overly complex.
When the mediator-arbitrator calls a witness whose presence has not
been requested previously by either of the parties, both parties will
share in payment of the fees. This provision may lead some parties
to attempt to decrease the cost of calling a witness by waiting until
the mediator-arbitrator calls the witness himself. This incentive to avoid
calling a witness, however, is counterbalanced by the ever-present risk
that the party who neglects to call a witness will lose valuable testimony
135. Alternatively, a legislature may wish to consider attaching a waiver provision to this
section so that an employee who can establish indigence may still be able to bring suit.
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that ultimately may cost him the case.
The parties are required to send each other and the mediator-arbitrator
copies of all relevant documents and a list of prospective witnesses
to ensure that the hearing is conducted on an open and informed basis.
Although it is not required by the statute, the parties are free to draw
up and distribute a legal brief setting forth their position. The desirability
of drafting a brief will depend on the complexity of the fact situation
involved and the importance of the case.
4(d) Conduct of the mediation-arbitration hearing(i) The proceedings shall be informal. The mediationarbitration hearing will not be open to the public. The
mediator-arbitrator will determine who shall be allowed
to attend the hearing. The mediator-arbitrator may conduct the hearing in whatever manner he or she believes
will permit a full and expeditious presentation of the
evidence and arguments of the employer and the employee.
Technical rules of evidence shall be relaxed. The mediatorarbitrator may admit any evidence or other data that he
or she considers to be relevant to the issues under consideration at the hearing.

Comment
I. Closed hearings- Closed hearings are critical to the establishment of informal proceedings. 136 Without the pressures of public
scrutiny, the parties are more likely to confront the dispute in a candid
and open manner. Discussions before the mediator-arbitrator under
these conditions will be uninhibited. By encouraging informality in this
manner, the statute will improve the possibility of settlement; a freewheeling discussion is more likely to result in the parties working
together than a traditional public proceeding where the parties will be
worried about creating an appearance of having compromised or
capitulated.
2. Relaxed rules of evidence- This proposal permits the mediatorarbitrator to use· relaxed rules of evidence 137 in the hearing as is
136. Of the state proposals, only the Michigan bill, supra note 82, provides for limited attendance at the hearings.
137. Use of relaxed rules of evidence would entail, for example, the admission of evidence
which may be deemed irrelevant or incompetent in a court. It may also include admission of
confessions, permissible inferences from failure to testify or produce documents, as well as the
admission of illegally obtained evidence. For good discussions of evidentiary problems in labor
arbitration, see Edwards, Due Process Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. 141 (1970);
Fleming, Some Problems of Evidence Before the Labor Arbitrator, 60 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1961).
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commonly done in other non-jury adjudicatory forums. 138 This provision thus gives the mediator-arbitrator discretion to dispense with
technical hearsay, materiality, and exclusionary rules, in favor of a
general standard of fairness.
There are two major advantages in applying relaxed rules of evidence.
First, they enhance the possibility of settlement. 139 The mediatorarbitrator may allow the parties to talk freely without strict regard to
whether their remarks are relevant to the dispute. As a result, the parties
will stand a better chance of working out frustrations and hostility
that might freeze the dispute.
Second, relaxed rules will relieve the mediator-arbitrator and the
parties of procedural burdens that would otherwise jeopardize speedy
dispute resolution. Requiring technical rules, for example, would force
a mediator-arbitrator - who is not a judge and may not even be a
lawyer - to undergo training in the use and application of state and
federal rules of evidence. Such training would increase the overall cost
to the public of the mediation-arbitration proceeding. Equally important,
parties unfamiliar with technical rules of evidence will be discouraged
from cost-saving prose advocacy. 140 Technical rules would also cause
delay in the pre-hearing stages because the parties and their attorneys
would be required to sift through the evidence to determine what is
admissible and what is not. 141 Finally, technical rules would create inflexibility in the proceedings; 142 use of an exclusionary-type rule, for
example, would impair the mediator-arbitrator's ability to draw out
the relevant facts. 1 • 3
Of the state proposals, only the Michigan bill, supra note 82, provides for the use of relaxed
rules of evidence.
138. Relaxed rules of evidence are used in nonjury trials, administrative tribunals, see generally
3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 218-75 (3d ed. 1980), and labor arbitration, see generally
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 87, at 252-96.
139. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 85, at 254; M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 93 (1974).
140. R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 137 (1980). Lorch discusses
the use of relaxed rules of evidence in administrative proceedings, as well as the drawbacks of
using technical rules of evidence. His comments are applicable to mediation-arbitration of at-will
employment discharge disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
141. R. LORCH, supra note 140, at 137.
142. See Edwards, supra note 137, at 146. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra
note 87, at 252-56.
143. A clearer picture can often be gained by allowing the parties to discuss what they feel
is important.
The more serious danger is not that the arbitrator will hear too much irrelevancy,
but rather that he will not hear enough of the relevant. Indeed, one advantage frequently reaped from wide latitude to the parties to talk about their case is that apparent rambling frequently discloses very helpful information which would otherwise
not be brought out.
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1017 (1955).
See also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 85, at 255.
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The advantages of relaxed rules can be gained without sacrificing
fundamental fairness to the parties. The mediator-arbitrator will have
sufficient discretionary power to prevent any violation of the traditional concerns underlying the rules that would place one party at a
clear disadvantage} 44 At any point in the proceeding the mediatorarbitrator may exclude or simply disregard evidence that is unduly
repetitious, irrelevant, or improper. 145 In addition, the mediatorarbitrator may allow each side to cross-examine witnesses and rebut
evidence presented at the hearing. 146 Cross-examination will help ensure that fairness is protected in two ways: it will increase the accuracy
of the testimony and provide a more complete presentation of the facts.
The relaxed rules of evidence proposed here are not a new concept;
they have been used with considerable success in several proceedings
that are analogous to the mediation-arbitration hearing: arbitration pursuant to a commercial contract or a collective bargaining agreement,
administrative law proceedings, and non-jury court adjudication. In
commercial or labor arbitration, arbitrators frequently create their own
evidentiary standards 141 or follow the relaxed rules promulgated by the
American Arbitration Association. 148 In these cases, arbitrators use a
modified due process standard, 149 comparable to the one advocated
144. One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is equally
capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received, and since he will base his
findings upon the evidence which he regards as competent, material and convincing,
he cannot be injured by the presence in the record of testimony which he does not
consider competent or material.
3 K. DAVIS, supra note 138, at 229 (quoting Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215,
224 (8th Cir. 1942)).
145. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 85, at 256; R. LORCH, supra note 140, at 136-37.
146. The mediator-arbitrator's discretionary power in allowing cross-examination is similar
to that of an administrative law judge. Although the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 556 (I 976), expressly provides for cross-examination, case law in the administrative setting
indicates that cross-examination is not always provided as of right; rather it is subject to the
discretion of the court or examiner. See, e.g., Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); American Public Gas Ass'n. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Some commentators argue that cross-examination is not always
necessary to a fair hearing. See Friendly, Some Kind of a Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1285 (1975) (noting that some scholars have overestimated the value of cross-examination); R.
LORCH, supra note 140, at 142-43 (discussing the circumstances where cross-examination may
not be necessary).
147. [A]rbitrators have established the pattern of ordered informality; performing major
surgery on the legal rules of evidence and procedure but retaining the good sense of
those rules; greatly simplifying but not eliminating the hearsay and parole evidence
rules; taking the rules for the admissibility of evidence and remolding them into rules
for weighing it; striking the fat but saving the heart of the practices of cross-examination,
presumptions, burdens of proof, and the like.
Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, 11 PROC. ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB. I, 13 (McKelvey
ed. 1958).
148. American Arbitration Association Rules 28, 30 L.A. 1089, cited in F. faK0URI & E.
ELKOURI, supra note 85, at 253.
149. See Getman, What Price Employment? Arbitration, the Constitution, and Personal
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by this proposal, and decide evidentiary questions according to common
sense and fairness. ' 50 Similarly, under the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA")' 5 ' administrative tribunals are free to use relaxed rules
of evidence, also subject to general principles of due process. 152 Finally, judges presiding at non-jury trials often admit evidence indiscriminately, ruling on weight and relevance only after all the facts
have been presented. 153 Because the technical rules of evidence are
designed primarily to prevent a jury from being unduly influenced by
evidence that is both prejudicial and irrelevant, 1 54 few objections have
been raised to the use of relaxed rules in non-jury trials. 155 Clearly,
this rationale supports the use of relaxed rules in the mediationarbitration setting.
(4)(d)(ii) The mediator-arbitrator may administer oaths and require
the attendance of witnesses. The mediator-arbitrator may
also require the production of books, papers, contracts,
agreements, and documents that he or she considers to
be necessary for a complete understanding and determination of the issues in dispute. To ensure compliance with
the requirements of this provision, the mediator-arbitrator
may issue subpoenas. In the event an individual or a party
to the dispute refuses to obey a subpoena, be sworn,
testify, or otherwise cooperate with the mediatorarbitrator, the mediator-arbitrator may invoke the ~id of
the local court of general jurisdiction to issue an appropriate order. The court may punish a failure to obey
the order as contempt.
Freedom, 29 PROC. ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB. (1976), reprinted in A. WESTIN & s.
SALISBURY, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION 281, 282 (1980).
150. See Edwards, supra note 137, at 169.
151. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
152. See Fairbank v. Hardin, 429 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970)
(technical rules of evidence are not applicable in administrative hearings); Wherley v. Gardner,
374 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1967) (administrative agencies are not required to use rigid rules of evidence);
Rosedale Coal Co. v. Director of U.S. Bureau of Mines, 247 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1957) (relaxed
rules of evidence may be used as long as principles of fundamental fairness are not violated);
Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1951) (administrative agencies may
use relaxed rules of evidence if they adhere to princples of due process). See generally 3 K.
DAVIS, supra note 138, at 235-38.
153. F. ELKOUR! & E. ELKOURI, supra note 85, at 255.
154. For example, hearsay, evidence of past misconduct, and opinions of witnesses can all
prejudice a jury even though that evidence itself does not bear directly on the fact to be proved.
For this reason the standard of relevancy was developed, with all its attending evidentiary rules.
I J. W1GMORE, EVIDENCE § 9, at 290 (3d ed. 1940). See also Fleming, supra note 137.
155. Concerning the rules of evidence, Charles McCormick said that "[as) rules they are
absurdly inappropriate to any tribunal or proceeding where there is no jury." 5 ENcYc. Soc.
Sci. 637,641 (1931), quoted in 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 138, at 225. See also 3 K. DAVIS, supra
note 138, at 224-33; I J. WIGM0RE, supra note 154, § 4 (b), at 27; Fleming, supra note 137, at 134.
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Comment
A complete understanding of the issues and positions of both sides
is critical if the mediation-arbitration process is to succeed. Thus, the
mediator-arbitrator is permitted to swear in witnesses. 156 In addition,
the mediator-arbitrator is empowered to call any witness or subpoena
any documents that, notwithstanding the wishes of the parties, he or
she feels may contribute to a fuller understanding of the case. 157 To
ensure that this provision is enforceable, the mediator-arbitrator is free
to request a court order from a local state court.
(4)(d)(iii) The mediator-arbitrator, for good cause shown, may
adjourn the hearing upon his or her own initiative or upon
the request of a party, and shall adjourn the hearing when
both parties agree to the adjournment.
(iv) The mediation-arbitration hearing may proceed in the
absence of one of the parties, if, after due notice, the
party in question fails to appear at the hearing, and fails
to obtain an adjournment of the hearing as provided in
subsection (iii). A mediator-arbitrator shall not grant or
deny an award solely on the default of a party. Rather,
the mediator-arbitrator shall require the non-defaulting
party to submit evidence, as necessary, to support an
award in its favor.

Comment
The mediator-arbitrator may temporarily adjourn the hearing if he
or she concludes that it is necessary to the preservation of fairness
for one or both of the parties. The mediator-arbitrator should not
postpone the hearing for frivolous reasons or if it appears that the
request for adjournment is merely a delaying tactic. If both parties
agree to adjourn, however, the decision no longer rests in the hands
of the mediator-arbitrator, and the hearing will be adjourned
automatically. Clearly, if both parties agree to adjourn, there is no
danger that one party will be able to abuse the rules to harass the other.
To expedite dispute resolution and avoid unnecessary delays, "the
156.

A similar rationale has lead to granting the power to administer oaths to arbitrators,

see, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 1614(a)(l); PA. R. Crv. P. 1304(b), and administrative law judges, see,
e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976); N.Y. STATE ADMIN. PROC. AcT § 304(1) (1976), both of whom
serve in a similar capacity to mediator-arbitrators.
157. In granting the mediator-arbitrator the power to issue subpoenas, the model statute
parallels many state statutes which grant subpoena power to arbitrators, see BNA, PROBLEMS
OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION 140 (1967), and administrative law judges, see, e.g., N.Y. STATE AoMJN.
PROC. ACT § 304(2) (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.O90(9)(b) (West Supp. 1982).
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mediator-arbitrator is authorized to proceed ex parte 158 if one party
fails to appear without first having requested and obtained an adjournment. Nevertheless, because an award must be based on substantial
evidence, 159 the non-defaulting party will still be required to present
his case.

4(d)(v) When presentation of the evidence has been completed,
the mediator-arbitrator shall begin mediation between the
parties. In conducting mediation, the mediator-arbitrator
may speak to the parties together ·or separately. To
facilitate mediation, the mediator-arbitrator may give the
parties a preliminary assessment of their respective legal
positions. This assessment must, however, be based on
the law of just cause as developed in previous dismisal
cases. Any agreement which the parties reach must be
put into writing and signed by the parties or their respective attorneys.

Comment
After the evidence has been presented, both parties should see more
clearly the weaknesses in their respective positions. At this point their
views are likely to have softened, creating an opportunity for settlement.160 The mediator-arbitrator must capitalize on this moment. If
he or she has developed a solid knowledge of the case, it should be
possible to convince the parties to work together to resolve their dispute.
If, however, mediation proves difficult to initiate, the mediatorarbitrator may give the parties a preliminary assessment of the case.
Such an assessment would illuminate the weaknesses in each party's
legal position that had not been emphasized previously. To avoid the
danger that this assessment process might be used to coerce the parties
into a settlement, the mediator-arbitrator will be required to base the
assessment upon straightforward legal conclusions drawn from previous
dismissal cases.

4(d)(vi) If, after a reasonable time, the mediator-arbitrator determines that settlement is unlikely, he or she may close the
hearing. Either party may request a continuance of mediation, subject to the discretion of the mediator-arbitrator.
158.
R. CT.
159.
160.
and the

This provision is similar to state rules allowing for ex parte abitration. See, e.g., CAL.
1610(b); PA. R. C1v. P. 1304(a).
See infra text accompanying note 169.
Cf. Fuller, supra note 89, at 26 (noting that the time between presentation of evidence
granting of an artibration award is an "especially propitious moment for settlement").
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Comment
After handling a number of dismissal cases, the mediator-arbitrator
should have sufficient experience to determine when a case no longer holds
potential for settlement. If, however, one of the parties demonstrates
that additional time is needed to achieve a settlement, it is only equitable
and reasonable to permit the mediator-arbitrator to give weight to those
considerations when deciding whether to grant a continuance. Ultimately, however, the mediator-arbitrator must make the final decision; allowing the parties to obtain a continuance upon request alone could potentially lead to intolerable delay and stalling.
(4)(d)(vii) The mediator-arbitrator shall tape-record the hearings.
This tape recording shall serve as the official record of
the hearings and shall be deposited with the court clerk.
(viii) The employer, the employee, or both, may, after the
scheduled hearing, request the court clerk to make a
typed copy of the transcript. The party that requests
a copy of the official record shall bear the costs necessary
for its preparation.

Comment
These provisions are designed to provide a record of the proceedings
from which an appeal may be made. 161 The use of a tape recorder
by the mediator-arbitrator will help reduce costs 162 without violating
principles of due process. 163
SECTION 5:
S(a)

EFFECTS OF MEDIATION-ARBITRATION

If the parties sign a written agreement during the mediationarbitration proceedings, or reach a private settlement in

161. A record of the hearing is especially important where the reviewing court is given discretion to review the evidence supporting the mediator-arbitrator's decision. Both the statute proposed here, see Section 6, infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text, and the Michigan bill,
supra note 82, allow for review and provide for a recording of the hearing. The Pennsylvania
bill, supra note 82, in contrast, allows for review only on grounds of fraud, collusion, unlawfulness,
or failure to act within the proper jurisdiction. Because there is less need for recording when
there is such limited review, it is not provided for.
162. Skilled stenographers "command increasingly high salaries and there is a growing scarcity
of them." B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 133 (1972).
163. Tape-recording is an accepted method of recording proceedings. At least one state Alaska - has adopted this method as a legal alternative for recording trial proceedings. ALASKA
CT. R. 75(a).
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writing any time prior to the rendering of an award by the
mediator-arbitrator as described in subsection 5(b), that settlement will be enforced in the local state court of general
jurisdiction. Such a settlement shall preclude any further
state common law actions against unjust dismissal.

Comment
This subsection is designed to permit flexibility in obtaining settlements. Thus, the statute allows the parties to reach their own
negotiated settlement any time prior to the rendering of the mediatorarbitrator's award. To prevent unnecessary litigation and encourage
efficient dispute resolution, the subsection provides that a private settlement shall automatically preclude the employee from initiating any
additional action to recover for an unjust dismissal under state law. 164
5(b)

(5)(c)

If the parties fail to reach a settlement before, during, or
after the hearing, the mediator-arbitrator shall, within thirty
days after the close of the hearing, render a signed opinion
and make an award based on the issues and evidence
presented during the hearing. The mediator-arbitrator's
award shall be final and binding on the parties.
If an employer or an employee willfully disobeys or offers
resistance to an arbitration award, the local state court of
general jurisdiction in the jurisdiction in which the dispute
arose or in which the employee resides is authorized, upon
the request of either party, to issue an order enforcing the
award. If the party against whom the order was issued
disobeys or resists compliance with that order, that party
may be held in contempt. The court may use its discretion
to fine the party on a per diem basis for the duration of
the violation. In no case may the fine exceed $250.00 per day.

Comment
Subsection (b) sets forth the arbitration procedure employed in
mediation-arbitration. In the event it becomes necessary for the
mediator-arbitrator to impose a decision on the parties, this section
ensures that, though there will be ample time for careful consideration

164. Presumably, the parties could also incorporate a waiver of federal rights under title
VII, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974), or § 301 of the LMRA
into a private settlement.
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of the case, the decisionmaking process will be completed without inordinate delay.
Fairness considerations necessitate that the mediator-arbitrator base
the decision only on evidence presented at the hearing. 165 Without this
requirement the parties would not have an opportunity to rebut evidence
deemed critical to the outcome of the case. Similarly, because the
decision of the mediator-arbitrator is final and binding, a reasoned
opinion is required to promote the appearance of rationality and fairness
in the decisionmaking process. 166
The parties are given a choice of jurisdictions in which to enforce
the mediation-arbitration award. The purpose of this provision is to
protect those employees who work in a jurisdiction far from that of
their legal residence, and who would find it unduly burdensome to
obtain a court order in the jurisdiction where they are employed.
Finally, subsection (c) places enforcement power in the hands of the
court. Guidelines for imposing fines are established to prevent excessive
punishment while at the same time indicating to the judge the importance
which the state legislature attaches to cooperation with the mediatorarbitrator. A maximum fine of $250.00 per day is large enough to force
even a sizable company to comply.
(5)(d) Remedies- The remedies the mediator-arbitrator may
select include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) The sustainment of the discharge.
(ii) Reinstatement of the discharged employee with no
back pay.
(iii) Reinstatement of the discharged employee with partial back pay.
(iv) Reinstatement of the discharged employee with full
back pay.
(v) A severance payment.

Comment
This section is designed to give the mediator-arbitrator broad power
and discretion in formulating an award. The possibilities listed are not
exclusive, and the mediator-arbitrator may formulate remedies to fit
the specific facts of the case before him. Reinstatement is included

165. See Friendly, supra note 146, at 1282. Judge Friendly argues that the right to have a
decision based only on the evidence presented at the hearing is a prerequisite to a fair hearing.
See infra note 168.
166. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 138; at 110-16. A reasoned opinion is also necessary to
facilitate judicial review. Id. at 103-05; cf, Friendly, supra note 146, at 1291-92.
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as a possible remedy, despite the controversy it has recently evoked
under collective bargaining agreements, 167 because in some situations
it may be the only effective alternative available. A sixty-year-old
employee, for example, will not be well served by a severance payment; unless he is reinstated, he will likely be left jobless for the rest
of his life.
SECTION 6:

JUDICIAL REVIEW

The state court of general jurisdiction for the jurisdiction in which
the dispute arose or in which the employee resides may review an award
made by the mediator-arbitrator, but only for the reasons that the award
is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
that the mediator-arbitrator was without or exceeded his or her jurisdiction; or that the award was procured by fraud, collusion, or other
similar and unlawful means. The pendency of a proceeding for review
shall not automatically stay the award of the mediator-arbitrator.

Comment
This section of the statute grants a limited right to review in state
court for either party. 168 To withstand judicial review, the mediationarbitration award must be supported by substantial evidence. 169 This
167. For differing views on the validity of reinstatement as a dismissal remedy in the collective bargaining setting, see Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357 (1981);
Malinowski, An Empirical Analysis of Discharge Cases and the Work History of Employees
Reinstated by Labor Arbitrators, 36 ARBITRATION J., March 1981, at 31; McDermott & Newhams,
Discharge-Reinstatement: What Happens Thereafter, 24 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 526 (1971).
168. Judicial review is granted instead of a trial de novo because a jury trial is not required
to resolve disputes when a new cause of action has been created by the legislature. In Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977), Justice White, writing for the majority, held
that "[Congress will have] created a new cause of action [through an administrative tribunal],
and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law, and placed their enforcement in a tribunal
supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved. The Seventh Admendment is no
bar to the creation of new rights or to their enforcement outside the regular courts of law."
Although the Court was referring to the enforcement of new rights in administrative tribunals,
the same rationale applies for a mediation-arbitration hearing provided fundamental requirements
of due process are met.
Judge Friendly argues that, to be constitutional, a "fair hearing" must include (I) an unbiased
tribunal, (2) notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity
to present reasons that the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the right to call witnesses,
(5) the right to know the evidence against one, (6) the right to have the decision based only
on the evidence presented, (7) the right to counsel, (8) the making of a record, (9) a statement
of reasons by the decision maker, (10) public attendance, and (11) judicial review. Friendly,
supra note 146, at 1279-95. Of these 11 "requirements" Judge Friendly contends that all but
the first three are dispensable in certain cases. Id. at 1279-95. The mediation-arbitration process
satisfies all the requirements of a fair hearing except an "open forum."
169. The Administrative Procedure Act requires judicial review of agency decisions that are
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review on the merits furthers the important goal of contributing to
the parties' perception that the procedure is fair by putting a check
on the discretionary powers of the mediator-arbitrator. 110
The standard of review prescribed by this proposal is broader than
that ordinarily accorded arbitration awards. Most state arbitration
statutes allow review of procedure, and no review of the merits. 111 These
statutes, however, apply only to the review of awards made pursuant
to arbitration proceedings to which both parties contractually consented. 112 In contrast, mediation-arbitration is a statutorily mandated
procedure. It is compulsory and nonconsensual. Thus, it is not clear
that review confined to procedure will satisfy basic principles of due
process.
The use of a standard of limited judicial review in administrative
agency hearings supports the approach taken here. The rationale for
a limited review in the administrative agency setting is that administrative
judges have a superior knowledge of the subject matter of the disputes
within their agency, and thus deserve considerable deference. 1 7 3
Mediation-arbitration proceedings are similar to administrative proceedings in this respect; the mediator-arbitrator has a well-developed
and specialized knowledge of employment relations which should be
accorded heavy deference. Thus, the rationale for using a limited review
in the administrative agency context is clearly applicable to mediationarbitration. 114

"unsupported by substantial evidence . . . . " 5 U .S.C. § 706(2)(e) (1976). Many state statutes
and constitutions, however, require review only where the ruling is "unsupported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence .... " E.g., MICH. CONST., art. VI,§ 28; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.04.130 (1974) ("unsupported by material and substantial evidence ... "). Because the model
statute is intended to serve as a state statute, the constitutional requirements of a particular
state may mandate that a different scope of review be incorporated into that state's version
of this statute. See St. Antoine, supra note 6, at 37; see also R. LORCH, supra note 140, at
I 78-79 (discussing problems with the substantial evidence test).
170. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 138, at 171-74.
171. E.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 7314 (Purdon 1982); WASH. REV. Com.§ 7.04.160 (1961).
172. See, e.g., PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (Purdon 1982). Consent is required under
both commercial arbitration clauses and collective bargaining agreements.
173. See Friendly, supra note 146, at 1294-1304.
174. But see Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 86-89. Mennemier, however, in commenting upon
the Michigan proposal, argues that the "competent, material, and substantial evidence" standard would give inadequate deference to the arbitrators' expertise in employment matters and
would undercut the interest in finality. Thus, Mennemeier concludes that only review of jurisdiction
and abuse of arbitrator discretion should be available. Yet, Mennemeier also notes that if the
object of arbitration of at-will employment dismissal cases is not to make use of the arbitrator's
expertise, but rather to relieve congestion in the courts by getting rid of the easy cases, then
a "substantial evidence" test is appropriate. Id.
Mennemeier does not consider the question of whether a review of the merits might be required in the case of non-consensual arbitration. A court in this setting would likely consider
the important interests at stake for both parties, as well as the relatively insignificant burdens
entailed in review. These factors may lead the court to infer a right of judicial review from
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This review process, however, must not be used as a means by which
the employer may delay paying damages; nor may the employer use
the threat of that delay to coerce employees into making unreasonable
settlements. To insure against this possibility the statute provides that
the award will not be automatically stayed pending the appeal. 115
SECTION 7:

POSTING OF THIS ACT

An employer shall post a copy of this Act in a prominent place in
the work area. Directly above the copy of the Act, an employer shall
post a sign in capital letters not less than two inches tall stating the
following: STATE LAW PROTECTS EMPLOYEES FROM UNJUST
DISMISSAL. The employer's failure to post a copy of this Act will
result in a $500 fine payable to the state.

Comment
The purpose of this section is to inform employees of their rights
under this statute. A similar provision is included in both the Michigan
and the Pennsylvania bills. Unlike these existing bills, however, the
section proposed here adds a supplementary requirement that a largelettered sign be placed over the notice to attract the employee's attention.

-Liana Gioia
Per Ramfjord

legislative silence in this area. Moreover, Mennemeier overlooks the fact that the parties will
still be subject to the findings of the mediator-arbitrator. Consequently, review would not render
the award or the proceedings meaningless.
175. Mennemeier, supra note 6, at 88 (noting that review on the merits would tend to prolong the adversarial relationship between the parties; providing that the award will not be stayed
pending appeal does little to solve this problem).

